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CHAPTER 7 
Constitutional Law 
MARC G. PERLIN" 
§7.1. Introduction. During the Survey period, the United States 
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a number of well-
publicized Massachusetts statutes. Among these were the veterans pref-
erence law for state employment,] parental consent requirements in con-
nection with a minor's abortion decision,2 and the statute requiring the 
administration of a breathalyzer test to a motorist arrested for driving 
under the influence of liquor.3 In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts considered constitutional issues related to municipal 
restrictions on tenant evictions from apartments converted into condo-
minium units 4 and from mobile home parks,5 the scope of a munici-
pality's rights of free expression,6 and state-ordered medical treatment.7 
This chapter will focus on the federal and state constitutional issues in 
these and in other significant cases. 
It is noteworthy that during the Survey period, the Supreme Judicial 
Court has given increasing attention to provisions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution in deciding cases in which the parties have argued both 
federal and state constitutional bases for their positions. The Supreme 
Judicial Court has not generally accepted the invitation of certain 
justices of the United States Supreme Court to utilize state constitutional 
" MARC G. PERLIN is an Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law 
School. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Andrew B. O'Donnell, 
a third-year law student, in preparing this . chapter. 
§7.1. 1 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 
(1979), discussed at § 3 infra. 
2 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), discussed at § 4 infra. 
3 Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), discussed at § 7 infra. 
4 Grace v. Town of Brookline, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038, dis-
cussed at § 2 infra. 
5 Newell v. Rent Board of Peabody, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713,392 N.E.2d 837, 
discussed at § 2 infra. 
6 Anderson v. City of Boston, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 629, dis-
cussed at § 2 infra. 
7 Custody of a Minor, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 379 N.E.2d 1053, and Com-
missioner of Correction v. Meyers, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2523, 399 N.E.2d 452, dis-
cussed at § 5 infra. 
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provisions to grant more protection to individuals than that accorded 
by the Supreme Court under the federal constitution. 8 In recent years, 
however, the Supreme Judicial Court has focused in more depth on 
state constitutional law. With the knowledge that a decision based on 
state constitutional grounds will be insulated from federal court review,!) 
the Supreme Judicial Court has breathed new life into state constitutional 
provisions that have been little used in the past. Therefore, this chapter 
will also highlight such provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution. 
§7.2. Economic Regulation-Substantive Due Process. In three ma-
jor cases the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the government's right to 
regulate private enterprise in areas affecting housing and public health. 
Two cases 1 dealing with the sensitive issue of municipal regulation of 
rents and tenant eviction raised issues of federal due process and equal 
protection 2 as well as cognate state constitutional issues. The third 
8 In the context of criminal procedures, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, has noted: 
In light of today's erosion of Miranda standards [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)] as a matter of federal constitutional law, it is appropriate to 
observe that no State is precluded by the decision from adhering to higher 
standards under state law. Each State has power to impose higher standards 
governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal 
Constitution. 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). See also Note, Stepping into the Breach: Basing Defendants' Rights on 
State Rather than Federal Law, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339 (1978); L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-4 (1978); Daughtrey, State Court Activism 
and Other Symptoms of the New Federalism, 45 TENN. L. REV. 731 (1978); Douglas, 
State Judicial Activism-The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. 
REV. 1123 (1978); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Cronin, Constitutional Law, 1976 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW § 13.5, at 428 n.269. 
For a recent instance where the Supreme Judicial Court interpreted a state con-
stitutional provision to accord more protection to criminal defendants than is re-
quired by the United States Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Soares, 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 593, 627, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1980). The 
Court held that the use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases to exclude fros-
pective jurors from petit juries based solely on their race violates art. 12 0 the 
Declaration of Rights. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
9 See references in Cronin, Constitutional Law, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 13.5, at 428 n.269. Of course, a claim that a state constitutional interpretation 
conflicts with the federal constitution is a federal question which may be heard in 
a federal forum. See U.S. CoNST. art. VI (supremacy clause). 
§7.2. 1 Grace v. Town of Brookline, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 
1038; Newell v. Rent Board of Peabody, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 392 N.E.2d 837. 
2 Federal constitutional attacks on state economic regulations are often two-
pronged, based on both due process and equal protection grounds. At least in the 
area of economic regulations, there is a blurring of these two concepts. The con-
stitutional standard used in analyzing each issue is basically the same: is there a 
rational connection between a legitimate legislative objective and the means by which 
the objective is achieved? See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973). In fact, given current interpretation of the due 
2
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case, dealing with state food-labeling regulations,3 raised not only due 
process issues but also issues concerning the commerce clause and fed-
eral preemption. In all three cases, the Court had little trouble disposing 
of the constitutional attacks. 
The common law notion that a landowner's right to do as he or she 
pleases with his or her property 4 has been considerably qualified during 
the twentieth century as state legislatures have become increasingly in-
volved in regulating and controlling the broad prerogatives of land-
owners." Recent housing shortages have given rise to municipal restric-
tions both on rent increases 6 and on a landlord's ability to evict a 
tenant.7 In addition, the growing dissatisfaction of apartment owners 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, one could argue that the equal protec-
tion clause itself is superfluous. In the area of "federal action," the Supreme Court 
has held that, while the fifth amendment has no equal protection clause, its due 
process clause has equal protection overtones. See, e.g., Karst, The Fifth Amend-
ment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541 (1977); Examining Bd. 
of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. DeOtero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1976); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,93 (1976); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
a Crocery Mfrs. of America, Inc. v. Dep't of Public Health, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2991, 393 N.E.2d 881. 
4 "A man has a right to do what he wants on his own land." J. BEUSCHER, 
R. WRIGHT, & M. CITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 1 (2d ed. 1976) 
(quoting Blackstone). Again quoting Blackstone: "So great, moreover, is the re-
gard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of 
it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community." Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
5 The growth in the use of the zoning power for land use control stems in part 
from the seminal United States Supreme Court decision in Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), upholding against a due process and equal protection 
attack a municipal plan which set up use limitations and districts. 
6 Although federal controls on rents can be traced back to the 1940s and World 
War II, the primary controls on rents have come from municipal level, generally 
through state enabling legislation granting local communities the power to enact 
controls. See C. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON HOUSING 737-38 (1973). Massa-
chusetts controls on rent may be traced back to 1920. See Bloom & Newman, Rent 
Control, 1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 19.1. In 1970, the Massachusetts legislature 
passed enabling legislation authorizing cities and towns with populations of 50,000 
or more to control rents and evictions. Acts of 1970, c. 842. For a history of rent 
control in Massachusetts, see Cleason, Kerr, & Martin, State and Local Government, 
1971 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW §§ 15.12 & 15.13. 
7 Many of the statutory restrictions in recent years seem to be based as much 
on a recognition of "consumers' rights" as on a legislative response to the housing 
shortage. For example, in 1973 Massachusetts forbade the use of self-help by a 
landlord in order to evict a tenant and required judicial process (summary process) 
to be used in all non-voluntary evictions. C.L. c. 184, § 18, as amended by Acts of 
1973, c. 778. By statute "retaliatory eviction" is a defense to a summary process 
action. C.L. c. 239, § 2A; see also C.L. c. 186, § 18. In addition, a court may allow 
a tenant to remain ill the premises for six months, "as the court may deem just and 
reasonable," even though the landlord has complied with all statutes regarding evic-
tion. C.L. c. 239, § 9. These statutes seem as much a result of a legislative reaction 
to the inequality of bargaining power between landlord and tenant as a recognition 
of the housing shortage. 
3
Perlin: Chapter 7: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§7.2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205 
with rent control, particularly during a period of increasingly scarce 
energy supplies has encouraged large-scale conversions of existing apart-
ments into condominiums S in certain localities. This Survey year wit-
nessed what is likely to be only the beginning salvo, albeit unsuccessful, 
by landlords against such restdctions, as the Supreme Judicial Court in 
Grace v. TOlen of Brookline n upheld the town of Brookline's temporary 
condominium eviction ban and in Newell v. Rent Board of Peabody 10 
upheld a much broader restriction on tenant evictions, one unlimited in 
duration. 
These decisions are best viewed against the background of the legis-
lative response to the housing shortage and the judicial support of that 
legislation. In 1970, the legislature enacted both a general rent control 
enabling statute for towns with populations of 50,000 or more 11 and a 
speCial enabling statute for the town of Brookline.12 This rent control 
legislation set up a mechanism to determine the maximum permissible 
rent for a covered unit and permitted municipalities to restrict tenant 
evictions. In addition, the general legislation exempted, and the special 
legislation permitted Brookline to exempt, owner occupied two and three 
family dwellings from the controls. In 1971, pursuant to the general 
legislation, Brookline and other towns and cities adopted rent control 
provlSlons. They also placed restrictions on evictions. Brookline, for 
instance, forbade evictions unless the landlord had first obtained from 
the rent control board a celtificate of eviction, which would issue only 
if certain speCified conditions had been met. 
In 1971, landlords from Brookline and other communities attacked 
both the general and special legislation and the local implementation 
acts on grounds of federal due process and equal protection. In Marshal 
House, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Brookline,13 the Supreme Judicial 
Court sustained the validity of the legislation and the local ordinances. 
In particular, the Court held that the methods of fixing rent ceilings 14 
~ Condominiums are regulated by statute in Massachusetts. See G.L. c. 183A. 
\) 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038. 
10 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713,392 N.E.2d 837. 
11 Acts of 1970, c. 842. 
I:! Acts of 1970, c. 843. Prior to the 1970 acts, Brookline had enacted a by-law 
controlling rents, but it was struck down for lack of state enabling legislation. 
Marshal House v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200 
(1970). For a discussion of the first Marshal House case, see Garrity, Poverty Law, 
1970 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 10.5. Brookline generally regulated rents and evic-
tions under c. 842 from 1970 until 1975 and under c. 843 since 1976. See 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2258-59, 399 N.E.2d at 1039-40. 
13 358 Mass. 686, 266 N.E.2d 876 (1971), the second Marshal House case. See 
note 12 supra. 
14 The legislation included a provision for a "rollback" in rent to the amount 
charged six months before the town's acceptance of the enabling act. 358 Mass. at 
700, 266 N .E.2d at 886. 
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and the standards for adjusting rent ceilings did not violate the due 
process clause; that the exemption of certain owner-occupied housing 
did not create an unreasonable classification among landowners in the 
state; and that the special treatment of Brookline landlords also did not 
violate the equal protection clause."i More important than these par-
ticular holdings, however, was the hands-off standard of review that 
the Court adopted with respect to constitutional attacks on legislation 
-aimed at reducing the housing shortage: 
It is established that every presumption is to be indulged in favor 
of the validity of a legislative enactment. A classification contained 
therein should be struck down by the courts only when it is "arbi-
trary" and has no "fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation." :t\or is it necessary for the legislature to make explicit 
findings to support its enactments; as long as there are possible 
findings which the Legislature could reasonably have made in the 
legitimate exercise of the police power its acts will be upheld.16 
The legislation and the local enactments thus withstood the constitutional 
attacks in Marshal House. Eight years later, the Court again applied 
this hand-off, "rational-relation" standard of review to sustain local re-
strictions on condominium conversions and rent control of mobile homes. 
Having won the Marshal House battle earlier in the decade, the town 
of Brookline responded in kind to condominium conversion, a phenome-
non of the late 1970s which exacerbated the housing shortage that the 
1970 rent controls were meant to alleviate. Until 1978, Brookline's by-
laws did not particularly single out condominium conversion as a prime 
cause of its housing problems. Where a covered apartment unit had 
15 ld. at 694-95, 266 N .E.2d at 882-83. Substantive due process review of eco-
nomic legislation is likewise characterized by extreme judicial deference to legislative 
judgment. In the economic area (where personal liberties are not involved), the 
United States Supreme Court has indicated that a legislative enactment will not be 
held unconstitutional if any set of facts can be conceived which justifies the legisla-
tive decision. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). For a more recent pro-
nouncement, see Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), in 
which the Court rejected a substantive due process attack on a Maryland law pro-
hibiting producers or refiners of petroleum from operating retail gas stations. Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Stevens summarily disposed of the substantive due process 
attack in one short paragraph: 
Appellants' substantive due process argument requires little discussion. The 
evidence presented by the refiners may cast some doubt on the wisdom of the 
statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear that the Due Process Clause does not 
empower the judiciaI)' to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of 
legislation . . . ." 
ld. at 124 (footnote and citation omitted). Compare the "rebirth" of substantive 
due process in the area of privacy and ,the family unit, infra note 45. 
10 358 Mass. at 695-96, 266 N .E.2d at 883. 
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been converted into a condominium, a landlord could obtain a certifi-
cate of eviction from the rent control board if the landlord or his im-
mediate family intended to occupy the unit or if "just cause" existed. 17 
As a result of 1978 amendments to the by-law, however, a condominium 
developer could not obtain a certificate of eviction to eject a tenant 
already residing in a rent controlled unit. A purchaser of a condo-
minium unit who intended to occupy the unit, on the other hand, could 
still seek a certificate of eviction in order to eject a tenant in possession 
at the time of purchase. The amended by-law, however, provided for a 
mandatory six-month stay of issuance of the certificate, a stay which 
could be extended for an additional six months in case of hardship.1s 
Grace v. Town of Brookline presented to the COUlt a challenge to the 
constitutionality of this by-law, which absolutely prevented a condo-
minium developer from evicting a tenant in possession and which re-
stricted a condominium purchaser's ability to obtain occupancy of a unit 
from a tenant in possession at the time of the purchase for six to twelve 
months.19 
The plaintiffs in Grace were a condominium developer and a prospec-
tive purchaser of a condominium unit, neither of whom could immedi-
ately obtain certificates of eviction.20 The plaintiffs sought both in-
junctive and declaratory relief. After resolving a number of statutory is-
sues,21 the Court addressed the plaintiffs' due process contention that the 
by-law amendments constituted a taking of their property without just 
compensation. They claimed that "the amendments transfer the right 
to possess from the owner to the tenant and compel the condominium 
owner to become a landlord." 22 Citing cases that have upheld rent 
17 Art. XXXVIII, § 9(a), of Brookline by-laws, enacted under Acts of 1970, c. 
843, as described in 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2259-60, 399 N.E.2d at 1040. 
18 ld. at 2261,399 N.E.2d at 1040. 
1f) In May of 1979, the Brookline town meeting voted to prohibit the issuance of 
a certificate of eviction against a tenant who had possessed a unit continuously from 
a date prior to the recording of the master condominium deed. ld. at 2263 n.12, 
399 N.E.2d at 1041-42 n.12. This amendment, in effect, permanently prevents con-
dominium purchasers from evicting such tenants. Although the constitutionality of 
the May 1979 amendment was not before the Court in Grace, the validity of a per-
manent ban would be tested by the standards articulated in Newell v. Rent Bd. of 
Peabody, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 392 N.E.2d 837. See text accompanying notes 
32-42 infra. 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2261-62, 399 N.E.2d at 1041. 
21 ld. at 2264-71,399 N.E.2d at 1042-45. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the 
by-law provisions exceeded the scope of, and were in conflict with, both the rent 
oontrol enabling legislation and C.L. c. 239, §§ 9-11, dealing with discretionary stays 
of eviction, and that the provisions conflicted with the purpose of the general con-
dominium statute, chapter 183A. ld. 
22 ld. at 2271, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. 
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control statutes during times of public emergency,23 the Court reaffirmed 
that such controls were within the police power of the state. The 
Court recognized that the government's police power was limited and 
that at some point the character of the taking would be such that the 
eminent domain clause of the fourteenth amendment would be impli-
cated, thereby requiring that compensation be paid.24 The Court found, 
however, that the Brookline amendments did not so significantly intrude 
upon the landowners' property rights as to constitute an eminent domain 
taking.25 The Court remarked that "they merely limit the property 
owners' right to remove units from the rental market, by delaying recov-
ery for personal occupancy. . .. The period of delay required by 
these amendments does not render the provisions confiscatory." 26 The 
Court also pOinted out that during the stay period, the owner would 
still receive rent payments from the tenant.27 
The plaintiffs also mounted an equal protection challenge to the 
amendments, arguing that Brookline had created an unjustifiable classi-
fication based,on form of ownership.28 The amendments, they claimed, 
treated condominium landowners differently from all other landowners 
by subjecting them alone to restrictions on their right to evict tenants.29 
23 The Court cited Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Edgar A. Levy 
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feld-
man, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); and Marshal House, 
Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686, 266 N.E.2d 876 (1971). 
24 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2272, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. In Davidson v. Common-
wealth, 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2103, 2111, 395 N.E.2d 1314, 1318, the 
Appeals Court explained the difference between a non-compensable exercise of the 
state's police power and a compensable exercise of the eminent domain power: 
The essential distinction between an exercise of the State's eminent domain 
power which is compensable and an exercise of the police power which is not 
is that in the exercise of eminent domain a property interest is taken from the 
owner and applied to the public use because such use is beneficial to the 
public, while in the exercise of the police power an owner's property interest 
is restricted or infringed upon to prevent its use in a manner detrimental to the. 
public interest. 
I d. (citations omitted). 
25 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2273, 399 N.E.2d at 1045-46. 
26 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2273, 399 N.E.2d at 1046 (emphasis added). The 
Court's choice of the word "delay" is significant in assessing the constitutionality of 
the 1979 Brookline by-law amendment permanently banning tenant evictions from 
units converted into condominiums. See note 19 supra. If the housing shortage 
were to continue for an extended period of time, it could be argued that the longer 
period of delay entitles the owner to compensation for the "taking." See discussion 
of the "permanent" eviction ban upheld in Newell in text at notes 32-42 infra. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 The equal protection clause serves as a restraint against government's ability 
to draw lines or to classify. Since all legislation is in a sense line-drawing, the 
command of the equal protection clause, at least in the area where important or 
fundamental rights are not involved, is to classify reasonably. As Professor Tribe 
7
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Utilizing traditional "first-level" equal protection review as it had done 
in Marshal House, the Court concluded that the town reasonably could 
have viewed condominium conversion as a hindrance to the effective-
ness of rent control,3° Thus, having found a rational basis for the town's 
classification, the Court held that the amendments did not violate the 
equal protection clause.3! 
Unlike Grace, which upheld temporary condominium eviction restric-
tions, Nett;ell v. Rent Board of Peabody 32 presented for review a mu-
nicipal enactment that controlled rents and prohibited evictions in mo-
bile homes but contained no time limitation. Owners of mobile home 
parks had attacked both the special state enabling act 33 permitting the 
ordinance and the ordinance itself, not only on federal due process and 
equal protection grounds, but also on the basis of articles 1 34 and 10 35 
of the Massachusetts Constitution.36 
has noted, a statute can deny equality both by treating similarly situated persons 
differently or by failing to treat differently persons not similarly situated. L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBEJ. 
30 By the end of the 1970s the Supreme Court had clearly recognized three levels, 
or tiers, of equal protection review. The first level, dealing with statutory classifica-
tions in the economic and business area, requires minimal judicial scrutiny and the 
least amount of state justification in order for a court to uphold the statute. So 
"toothless" is this approach that a court should sustain the statute if it can conceive 
of a rational state objective behind it. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420 (1961). This is the standard of review adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court 
in these cases, since neither a suspect class nor fundamental right was 'involved. 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2274-76, 399 N.E.2d at 1046-47. 
32 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1713, 392 N.E.2d 837. 
33 Acts of 1976, c. 131, adding the special act, recited that the legislature had 
found that a housing emergency existed in Peabody, caused by "excessive, abnormally 
high and unwarranted rental increases imposed by some owners of mobile home parks 
located therein." ld. 
34 Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution reads: 
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and un-
alienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and de-
fending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting 
property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. 
Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, 
color, creed or national origin. 
35 Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution reads 
in part: 
Each individual of the society has the right to be protected by it in the 
enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws. He is 
obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of this protection; 
to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when necessary; but no part of 
the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied 
to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the 
people. In fine, the people of this commonwealth are not controllable by any 
other laws than those to which their constitutional representative body have 
given their consent. And whenever the public exigencies require that the prop-
8
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Without clearly explaining its reasoning, the Court summarily rejected 
plaintiffs' state and federal due process arguments and blurred the state 
due process analysis with that of the federal. 37 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Wilkins stated that the lack of a time limitation in the Peabody 
rent regulation and eviction ban was inconsequential and did not amount 
to a taking without just compensation.38 "[AJ provision for 'self-destruc-
tion' is not a constitutionally required element of a rent control statute 
or regulation." 31l The Court did indicate, however, that the constitu-
tionality of the restrictions would depend upon the existence of a housing 
emergency and that "[tJhe continuing existence of an emergency is a 
question that may be presented for further consideration, not only to 
the Legislature and the city, but also to the courts." 40 The plaintiffs 
also argued, as did the plaintiffs in Grace, that the Peabody enactment 
violated both federal and state equal protection provisions by treating 
mobile home park owners differently from other landowners.41 Again 
using a rational basis equal protection standard, the Court upheld the 
restrictions on the basis that the legislature could reasonably have found 
that a housing emergency existed in Peabody and that the owners of 
mobile home parks were causing that problem.42 
Both of the housing cases 43 dealing with rent and eviction controls 
are consistent with the contemporary judicial reluctance to interfere 
erty of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor. 
36 The Court rejected an argument that the special act had not been passed in 
accordance with the Home Rule Amendment, article 89 of the amendments to the 
Massachusetts Constitution. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1716-18, 392 N.E.2d at 839-40. 
37 ld. at 1719-20, 392 N.E.2d at 840. The Supreme Judicial Court recently noted 
that state and federal due process analysis in the economic area is essentially the 
same: 
While the State and Federal standards are phrased in virtually identical terms, 
we have noted that "[t]he Constitution of a State may guard more jealously 
against the exercise of the State's police power." . .. As a result, we have 
occasionally been less willing than ,the. Federal courts to ascribe to the Leg-
islature speculative and implaUSible ends, or to find rational the nexus said 
to exist between a plausible end and ,the chosen statutory means. 
Any difference between the two constitutional standards in the area of eco-
nomic regulation, however, is narrow. See, e.g., our comment regarding the 
applicability of a district [sic] State "due process" standard to the alteration 
of preexisting common law effected by the original "no fault" insurance leg-
islation. 
Blue Hills Cemetery, Inc. v. Board of Registration, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2647, 2652 
n.8, 398 N.E.2d 471, 475 n.8 (citations omitted). 
38 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1719-20, 392 N.E.2d at 840. 
39 ld. at 1719-20, 392 N.E.2d at 840. 
40 ld. at 1719, 392 N.E.2d at 840. 
41 ld. at 1720, 399 N.E.2d at 840-41. 
42 ld. at 1720, 399 N.E.2d at 841. 
43 A third case during the Survey period also dealt with the hOUSing shortage 
but in another context. In Massachusetts Home Mortgage Finance Agency v. New 
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with economic and social legislation. Substantive due process, judicial 
review of the wisdom and efficacy of economic legislation,44 is still a 
stepchild of the law,45 whether based on federal or state constitutional 
provisions. 
In Grocery Manufacturers of America v. Department of Public 
Health,46 the plaintiffs challenged an "open-date" food labeling regula-
tion promulgated by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health. 
They attacked the regulation not only on due process grounds but also 
on the ground that state regulation in this area conflicted with the power 
given to Congress under article I, section 8, of the Constitution to regu-
late interstate commerce.47 The regulation requires that food products 
sold in packaged form must indicate either the "last date of use"48 or a 
"pull date" 49 for the food product. Although the regulation applies to 
both perishable 50 and non-perishable 51 food products, plaintiffs attacked 
the regulation only insofar as it applied to nonrperishables. 
England Merchants Nat'! Bank of Boston, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2909, 382 N.E.2d 
1084, the Court approved the use of state mpney to make mortgage loans available 
to persons of low and moderate income. 
44 See note 15 supra. 
45 Despite the negative image of an activist court reviewing the wisdom of 
e.conomic legislation, which the term substantive due process evokes, see, e.g., 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), substantive due process is alive and 
well in the areas of personal and sexual privacy and family autonomy. The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that the. liberty component of the due process 
clause protects personal privacy and requires a strong state showing before the 
government can intrude in this area. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
(1978) (sounding in both substantive due process and equal protection); Moore 
v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429, U.S. 589 
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965). The Supreme Judicial Court during the Survey year recognized the 
legitimacy of federal substantive due process in the area of family autonomy in 
cases dealing with involuntary termination of parental rights. See, e.g., Custody 
of a Minor, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1117, 389 N.E.2d 68; Department of Public 
Welfare v. J.K.B., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh.2202, 393 N.E.2d 406. 
46 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2291, 393 N.E.2d at 881. 
47 ld. at 2293, 393 N.E.2d at 885. The case paints out that insofar as the 
regulation applies to both perishable and non-perishable food products, Massachu-
setts is again in the foref~ont of protecting consumer interests. ld. at 2295, 393 
N.E.2d at 886. 
48 Section 101.19(a)(2) of the Massachusetts Register defines "last date of use" 
as "that date beyond which the product may not be fit for consumption. In 
establishing the last date of use, ,the manufacturer shall assume that the product 
will be stored under those conditions re,commended for storage of the product on 
the label .... " ld. at 2311, 393 N.E.2d at 892-93. 
49 Section 101.19(a)(5) of the Massachusetts Register defines "pull-date" as 
the date after which the product may not be of the quality which the manufac-
turer represents it to be." ld. 
50 "'Perishable Food' means food that has a shelf Hfe of 60 days or less after 
manufacture." Section 101.19( a) (4). ld. 
51 "'Non-perishable food' means food that has shelf life of more than 60 days 
after manufacture." Section 101.19(a)(3). ld. 
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By statement of facts filed with the Supreme Judicial Coult,52 the 
parties agreed that food products deteriorate with age because of hand-
ling conditions and the environment in which they may be stored. 
Through testing and other procedures, manufacturers have been able 
to determine the period of time in which their products may not be of 
the expected quality at the time of consumption.53 Despite this ability 
and despite substantial consumer interest in open-date labeling, the 
Court noted that "open-date labeling is not required for non-perishable 
foods anywhere else in the country." 54 
After uphoiding the Department of Public Health's authority to 
promulgate the regulation, 55 the Court then addressed the argument 
that the regulation unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. 
This argument presented a classic issue of federalism: the extent to 
which the power given to Congress to regulate interstate commerce 
allows state regulation of goods in interstate commerce. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that Congress's constitutionally enumer-
ate power to regulate interstate commerce is not exclusive and does 
not in and of itself act to divest the states of power to legislate in areas 
also dealing with interstate commerce. 56 The Court has indicated that 
in the absence of an actual exercise of congressional power under the 
commerce clause local regulation that burdens interstate commerce is 
valid as long as the state interest in regulation outweighs any need for 
national uniformity 57 and as long as the regulation affects both intra-
state and interstate commerce eq1,lally.58 Hence, the Supreme Judicial 
Court examined the plaintiffs' commerce clause argument by determin-
ing whether the burden which the regulation imposed on interstate 
commerce was "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits" 50 of the regulation. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to 
52 Plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory relief directly in the Supreme Judicial 
Court pursuant to C.L. c. 231A, § 1. ld. at 2291, 393 N.E.2d at 884. 
53 ld. at 2294-95, 393 N.E.2d at 886. 
54 ld. at 2295, 393 N.E.2d at 886. 
55 The Court held that C.L. c. 94, § 192, which permitted regulation of the 
sale of misbranded foods, was broad enough to allow regulation of omissions of 
fact. Hence, the agency could regulate misbranding and labeling of items to 
ensure that they would be of the quality which they are implicitly represented to 
be by their presence on the shelvs. ld. at 2295-98, 393 N.E.2d at 886-87. 
56 See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
57 See, e.g., Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), where 
the need for national uniformity on railroad rates was found to prevent local rate 
legislation, even though COngress had not legislated national uniform rates. 
58 See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 
U.S. 177 (1938). 
50 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2304, 393 N.E.2d at 889 (quoting Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970». See also Raymond Motor Transporta-
tion, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). In an 1978 case, the United States Su-
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meet their burden of proving that the regulation burdened interstate 
commerce "and certainly did not demonstrate any excessive burden." 60 
The plaintiffs in Grocery Manufacturers unsuccessfully advanced sev-
eral other constitutional arguments against the validity of the regulation. 
First, they claimed that federal law had preempted the entire area. 
Hence, the state regulation had to fall by virtue of the supremacy 
clause of article VI of the Constitution.61 The Court determined that 
resolution of this issue, like the earlier commerce clause issue, required 
a balancing of state and federal interests. Finding no federal legislation 
specifically or impliedly forbidding or preempting state regulation of 
product labeling,62 the Supreme Judicial Court considered whether there 
was any conflict between the Massachusetts regulation and the goals 
of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 63 and the regulations 
thereunder. The Court observed: 
The typical preemption case involves State and Federal regula-
tion of the same subject. In such a case, "[t]he criterion for deter-
mining whether state and federal laws are so inconsistent that the 
state law must give way is ... whether, under the circumstances 
of the particular case, [the State's] law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.64 
preme Court asked whether a state regulation "is basically a protectionist measure, 
or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, 
with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental." City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
60 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2304, 393 N.E.2d at 889. In another case during 
the Survey period, the Supreme Judicial Court responded to an argument that a 
state restriction on automobile franchising violated the commerce dause" "The 
plaintiffs do not come near a demonstration that the statute will result in any 
lessening of the flow of automobiles into the Commonwealth, or in reduced sales 
here, or in an adverse influence on any other aspect of interstate economic activity." 
Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2468, 
2478, 381 N.E.2d 908, 914. 
61 The supremacy clause establishes the basis of federal supremacy in the context 
of our two-sovereign system of government: "This Constitution, and the laws of 
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the 
supreme law of the land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
62 Fe.deral preemption may be found by virtue of the existence of a comprehen-
sive congressional regulatory scheme, even though Congress has not specifically 
forbidden state regulation. In such a case, the Court may infer that Congress 
must have intended to preempt local regulation by the comprehensive nature of 
the federal legislation. See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 
624 (1973) (pervasive nature of federal legislation regulating aircraft noise held 
to preempt, by implication, local noise regulations). 
63 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1976). 
64 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2305, 393 N.E.2d at 890 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing 
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977)). 
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The Court ruled that the plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate any such 
conflict. 6;; Second, plaintiffs argued that the Massachusetts regulation 
violated the fourteenth amendment and article 10 of the Massachusetts 
Constitution by imposing criminal sanctions without giving fair notice 
of what conduct is forbidden.G6 The Court, in rejecting this argument, 
indicated that any imprecision is cured by the regulation's "substantial 
deference to the manufacturer's judgment concerning the date to be 
disclosed." 67 Finally, the Court addressed what appears to have been 
a substantive due process attack on the regulation, although never 
labeled as such. "There is no merit to the ... [plaintiffs'] argument 
that the regulation is invalid because it does not bear a real and sub-
stantial relation to the public, health, safety, morals or some other phase 
of the general welfare. . ., All rational presumptions are to be made 
in favor of the validity of the regulation." DR The Court thereby once 
again rejected a substantive due process attack on economic legislation 
and adopted an attitude of deference to the legislative judgment.69 
Thus Grace, Newell, and Grocery Manufacturers, dealing with both 
housing and product merchandising legislation, reveal that the Supreme 
Judicial Court has acknowledged the presumptive validity of economic 
legislation as a matter of federal constitutional law. These decisions 
also indicate that the Court has construed the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion to afford no greater protection than the federal Constitution. In 
this area, although litigants have heeded the United States Supreme 
Court's call to proceed under state constitutions,70 this approach in 
Massachusetts has resulted in no greater constitutional protections in 
the substantive due process area. 
§7.3. Sex Discrimination-Veterans Preference-Tenancy by the En-
tirety. Unlike other areas of constitutional law, the issue of sex discrimi-
nation in Massachusetts has been addressed during the Survey year 
65 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2304, 393 N.E.2d at 890. The Court noted that the 
Massachusetts regulation itself acknowledged specific instances of preemption by 
Congress by virtue of the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products 
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 453(e)-(f), 601(j) (1976), which deal with the 
dating of meat food products and poultry products. The Court did n'Ot discuss 
the scope of such preemptions. 
66 See, e.g., Papachrist'Ou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
67 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2309, 393 N.E.2d at 892. 
G8 Id. at 2309-10, 393 N.E.2d at 892 (citations 'Omitted). 
GU In Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2468, 381 N.E.2d 908, 
the Court rejected a substantive due process attack on the franchising statute, as 
follows: "[W]e need do no more in respect to any general due process contentions 
of a substantive character than to refer to . . . the grounds or reasoning on which 
the Legislature may be taken to have gone when it initiated [the statute]." Id. at 
2487, 381 N.E.2d at 918. 
70 See § 1 supra. 
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both in the legislature and in the courts. Progress was made in the 
laborious legislative task of conforming Massachusetts statutes to the 
mandates of the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment,1 In the 
judicial forum, the United States Supreme Court decision of Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,2 dealing with the constitu-
tionality of the Massachusetts veterans preference law,3 underscored 
the difficulties facing a plaintiff who relies upon federal equal protection 
principles to attack sex discrimination. Where a sex-neutral statute has 
a dispropOltionate adverse impact upon women, as the Massachusetts 
veterans preference law did, the plaintiff must prove that the statute is 
the product of a discriminatory, sex-based legislative purpose or policy. 
The Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment (hereafter ERA),4 
ratified in 1976 and amending article 1 of the Massaohusetts Declara-
tion of Rights, provides that "[e]quality under the law shall not be denied 
or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin." 5 In 
two opinions 6 during the year following ratification, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court made it clear that the ERA would have profound impact on 
Massachusetts law. These early interpretations indicated that the ERA 
had at least made sex a "suspect" class requiring a compelling state 
interest to uphold a legislative classification based on sex. In Opinion 
of the Justices,7 for instance, the Court stated: 
We believe that the application of the strict scrutiny-compelling 
State interest test is required in assessing any governmental classi-
§7.3. 1 For an analysis of necessary statutory changes in Massachusetts, written 
just prior to the ratification of the ERA, see SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION ON THE 
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT, FIRST INTERIM REPORT, Senate Doc. No. 1689 (1976). 
The legislative problems created by an ERA do not require simply that statutes 
be made "sex-neutral," i.e., that the legislature need only strike the word "woman" 
or "wife" from a statute and replace it with the word "person" or "spouse." The 
more difficult task requires examination of the substantive prOvisions themselves. 
[E]ach substantive provision must be scrutinized to determine whether it 
should be repealed, because. it is archaic or places an unfair burden on one 
sex that should not or cannot be extended to the other, or whether it should 
be extended to cover both sexes in an otherwise undisturbed form. When 
neither of these solutions seems appropriate, the law must be recast in order 
to reHect a new perspective of sex equality and to promote desirable social 
policy goals. 
B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 41-
42 [hereinafter cited as BROWN]. 
2 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
3 G.L. c. 31, § 23, recodified as G.L. c. 31, § 26. 
4 MASS. CaNST., art. of amend. 106. 
5 rd. 
6 Commonwealth v. King, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2636, 372 N.E.2d 196, and 
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2728, 
371 N.E.2d 426. 
7 See note 6 supra. 
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fication based solely on sex. Our State equal rights amendment was 
adopted at a time when equal protection principles under State 
and Federal Constitutions required a level of judicial scrutiny greater 
than the rational basis test but less than the strict scrutiny test. To 
use a standard in applying the Commonwealth's equal rights amend-
ment which requires any less than the strict scrutiny test would 
negate the purpose of the equal rights amendment and the inten-
tion of the people in adopting it. 8 
Thus the Court early made it clear that the commonwealth's ERA would 
be strictly construed. 
In a 1979 opinion, Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic 
Athletic Association, Inc.,9 the Court reaffirmed its commitment to equal 
rights under Massachusetts law. It indicated that the ERA, like the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, protects males 
as well as females from sex discrimination.1o At issue was the validity 
8 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2732-33, 371 N.E.2d at 428 (citation omitted). In 
the earlier case of Commonwealth v. King, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2636, 372 N.E.2d 
196, the Court's precise language was that the "degree of scrutiny must be at least 
as strict as the scrutiny required by the Fourteenth Amendment for racial classifica-
tions." ld. at 2655, 372 N.E.2d at 206 (emphasis added). The use of the lan-
guage "at least" raises the question whether the Massachusetts ERA may be inter-
preted to do more than make sex suspect. 
In some states with an equal rights amendment, ,the courts have reqUired a 
shOWing even stronger than the compelling state interest test to sustain a legislative 
sex classification. See, e.g., Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 903 (Md. App. 1977) 
(requiring an overriding compelling state interest). Given the few classifications 
that have survived United States Supreme Court application of the compelling state 
interest test under the equal protection clause, it is likely ,that little short of 
phYSiological differences between men and women will meet the "overriding com-
pelling state interest test." The Rand decision provides an excellent survey of the 
differing interpretations that state courts have given to state ERAs. They range 
from Virginia, which has equated its constitutional prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation with the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment (in essence, 
making the state provision superfluous), to the almost absolute interpretation of 
Pennsylvania that sex, in and of itself, can never be a basis for a legislative classifi-
cation. ld. at 903-04. It could be argued, however, that even under the Pennsylvania 
analysis, the legislature could enact a rape statute applicable to women only without 
violating/the ERA on the ground that physiological rather than sex differences are 
the basis for the classification. 
It seems possible, therefore, that the Supreme Judicial Court, by its carefully 
chosen language in the Opinion of the Justices, has left the door open for a 
Massachusetts ERA standard stricter than strict scrutiny. Of course, it may be some 
time before the Court has occasion to reach this issue since few sex classifications 
will ever survive the strict scrutiny test, thus making it unnecessary for the Court to 
reach the question of the applicability of a stricter standard. 
9 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284. 
10 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), in which the United States 
Supreme Court held that an Oklahoma sta,tute prohibiting the sale of 3.2 percent 
beer to males under age 21, but to females only under age 18, denied males be-
tween the ages of 18 and 20 equal protection. 
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of a rule of the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association 
( MIAA), which regulates competitive sports in public secondary schools 
in Massachusetts, that boys could not participate on a girls' athletic 
team. ll The Attorney General contended that the rule violated the 
Massachusetts ERA.12 
The Court first sounded a familiar theme in equal protection analysis 
by citing its earlier Opinion of the /ustices. 13 In this opinion the Court 
indicated that a proposed bill prohibiting girls from participating with 
boys in football and wrestling teams would violate the state ERA, since 
such an absolute "prohibition of all females from voluntary participation 
in a particular sport under every possible circumstance serves no com-
pelling state interest." 14 It then articulated the appropriate standard 
under the ERA for deciding the constitutionality of the classification 
set out in the MIAA rules. A classification based on sex must be justi-
fied by a "demonstrably compelling interest" 15 and must be narrowly 
drawn to correspond to the objectives of the statute. 
The defendants first argued that the MIAA rule imposed no stigma 
on boys because it sought to protect girls' athletic programs in public 
schools, lest girls be outnumbered on girls' teams by boys.16 This 
purported justification required the Court to enter the thicket of "benign 
discrimination" and to identify the appropriate ERA test for discrimina-
tion said to favor a "historically oppressed class." 17 The rule sought 
to give girls' teams an advantage in order to remedy the years of neglect 
in comparison with the treatment given boys' teams. In resolving the 
11 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1588, 393 N.E.2d at 28. A 1976 amendment to 
MIAA rules provided that "a student could not be barred from compe,ting for a 
place on a team because of sex unless the school provided a 'separate but equal' 
team." ld. (footnote omitted). Because of concern over welfare and safety issues, 
the MIAA amended the rule, effective in 1978, to forbid boys from playing on 
girls' teams and ,to allow girls to play on boys' teams in the event the school did 
not otherwise offer the particular sport for girls. ld. at 1589, 393 N.E.2d at 287. 
12 ld. at 1585, 393 N.E.2d at 285-86. The plaintiffs also argued that the rule 
violated C.L. c. 76, § 5, which forbids discrimination in public schools on the 
basis of race, color, sex, religion, and national orgin. The Court assume.d that 
the statute was equivalent to the later-enacted ERA and that a violation of the 
ERA was also a violation of the statute. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1585 n.5, 1596, 
393 N.E.2d at 286 n.5. 
13 See note 6 supra. 
14 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1592, 393 N.E.2d at 289 (quoting 1977 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 2736, 371 N .E.2d at 430). The flaw in such a statute rests in its all-
encompassing provisions, which fail to account for individual differences that may 
make the application of the rule inappropriate. The issue may be viewed as one of 
whether the sex-centered generalization which underlies such legislation "actually 
comported with fact." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
15 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1597, 393 N.E.2d at 291. 
16 ld. at 1596, 393 N.E.2d at 291. 
17 ld. at 1597, 393 N.E.2d at 291. 
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ERA issue of "benign discrimination," the Court, citing Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke,I8 concluded that the Supreme Court 
would require an "exceedingly persuasive" justification to uphold a sex 
classification against an equal protection attack, whether characterized 
as benign or not. l !! Since the Massachusetts standard, however, was 
to be formulated under the state ERA and not simply under "a general 
equal protection guarantee," 20 the Court concluded that "[u]nder ERA 
it is especially fitting and, we think, required, that any purported justi-
fication for a classification based on sex, even one claimed to involve 
'affirmative action,' should be weighed with great care." 21 Although 
the Court did not specifically so indicate, it would appear that under 
the ERA, benign sex discrimination is subject to strict scrutiny.22 
The Court also rejected a second argument that the rule did not 
classify on the basis of sex but rather only on the basis of physical 
ability. 23 Instead, it examined the defendants' argument that the rule 
18 438 U.S. 265 (1978). There was no majority opinion in Bakke. Five mem-
bers of the Court (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell) , 
however, took the, position that race could constitutionally be used as a factor in 
college admissions but that an inflexible minority admissions program setting aside 
a specific number of seats for minorities was improper. 
19 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1599, 393 N.E.2d at 292. Since sex is not subject 
to strict equal protection review, this approach is best categorized as "middle-tier" 
review. The Court also cited Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), where the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that Alabama's alimony-for-women-only 
statute was remedial. "[E]ven statutes purportedly designed to compensate for 
and ameliorate the effects of past discrimination must be carefully tailored. Where 
... the State's compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as well served by a 
gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with 
it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on 
the basis of sex." 440 U.S. at 283. See generally Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978). 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1600, 393 N.E.2d at 292. 
21 Id. at 1600-01, 393 N.E.2d at 292-93. 
22 The Court noted that other less restrictive approaches could have. been adopted 
instead of the broad approach of the rule: . 
Use of standards focusing on height, weight, or skill rather than solely on 
gender represents one such approach . . . . Admission could perhaps be 
regulated by handicapping in a sport like golf. On another level also, lesser 
measures than complete exclusion suggest themselves. Where boys' teams 
were not feasible, admission of boys to girls' teams could be limited, not 
to exceed reasonable numbers. In particular situations, rotating systems might 
be adopted by which qualified boys were admitted but only a certain number 
could play in a given game. 
Id. at 1606, 393 N.E.2d at 295. This "less restrictive alternative" test is typically 
reserved for strict scrutiny equal protection review. 
23 Such a generalization would be overbroad: "No doubt biological circum-
stance does contribute to some overall male advantages. But we think the dif-
ferences are not so clear or uniform as to justify a rule in which sex is sought to 
be used as a kind of 'proxy' for a functional classification." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1601, 393 N.E.2d at 293 (citation omitted). 
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served to provide safety for students engaged in competitive SpOrts.24 
The Court found no basis for the proposition that a girl is susceptible 
to injury when playing on a team with boys, other than the stereotype 
that females are inferior to males. The Court also implied that even 
if a correlation could be shown between injuries to girls and participa-
tion by boys on girls' teams, less drastic solutions, such as providing 
more protective equipment, should be considered before exclusion would 
be permitted. Even if exclusion were permitted at some point, the 
MIAA's wholesale exclusion of boys from all girls' teams regardless of 
a showing of increased risk to girls in each sports, would be unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.25 Hence, the Court found that the MlAA rule vi-
olated the Massachusetts ERA. 
The implications of the ERA were also considered on the legislative 
front. Chapter 727 of the Acts of 1979 signaled the end to the un-
certainty surrounding the tenancy by the entirety caused by the adop-
tion of the Massachusetts ERA.26 At common law, in a tenancy by 
the entirety a husband and wife had an undivided interest in the prop-
erty,27 but the husband was entitled to exclusive possession, control, 
and income from the property.28 The wife's interest in the tenancy 
in fa'ct was much more in the nature of a future interest by which 
she would acquire ownership if she survived her husband.29 The hus-
24 ld. at 1603-04, 393 N.E.2d at 293-94. 
25 ld. at 1604, 393 N.E.2d at 294. 
26 Approved on November 13, 1979, chapter 727 became effective 90 days there-
after. Chapter 727 amends G.L. c. 209, § 1, by adding the following: 
The real and personal property .9f any person shall, upon marriage, remain 
the separate property of such person, and a married person may receive, re-
ceipt for, hold, manage and dispose of property, real and personal, in the 
same manner as if such person were sole. A husband and wife shall be 
equally entitled to the rents, products, income or profits and to the control, 
management and possession of property held by them as tenants by the entirety. 
The interest of a debtor spouse in prope.rty held as tenants by the entirety 
shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of such debtor 
spouse so long as such property is the principal residence of the non-debtor 
spouse; prOvided, however, both spouses shall be liable jointly or severally for 
debts incurred on account of necessaries furnished to either spouse or to a 
member of their family. 
27 Two or more persons may also own property as joint tenants or tenants in 
common. For a. general discussion of tenancy in common, joint ,tenancy, and 
tenancy by the entirety, see 28 MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE, M. PARK & D. PARK, CON-
VEYANCING §§ 125-129 (1968). 
28 See generally Krokyn v. Krokyn, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1417, 1422-23, 390 
N.E.2d 733, 736; Glendon, Tenancy by the Entirety in Massachusetts, 59 MASS. 
L.Q. 53 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Glendon). 
29 Glendon, supra note 28, at 56. In this regard, note the oft-repeated adage 
that in a marriage, husband and wife are one, and ,the husband is the one. See 
Huber, Creditors' Rights in Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 
197 (1960). 
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band's interest could be reached by a creditor, but the creditor would 
take subject to the wife's survivorship interest.3il In contrast, in a jOint 
tenancy, each joint tenant's interest is subject to attachment and execu-
tion,al and each joint tenant has an equal right to possession, control, 
and income. Hence, the tenancy by the entirety provided a married 
couple with substantial protection from ·creditors which the joint tenancy 
did not provide. This factor likely accounted for its widespread popu-
larity, even during the movement toward equality of the sexes that 
marked the 1970s. 
Although the constitutionality of the tenancy by the entirety had occa-
sionally been attacked on fourteenth amendment equal protection 
grounds,32 it was not until passage of the Massachusetts ERA in 1976 
that the attack accelerated. Although the issue has not yet reached the 
Supreme Judicial Court,3:! various lower courts, state and federal, have 
grappled with the impact of the ERA on the tenancy by the entirety. The 
tenancy by the entirety generally has not fared well. For example, in 
1978 a state superior court justice ruled that the ERA entitled a wife to 
a share, with her husband, of rents from commercial property held by 
them as tenants by the entirety, despite the common law rule that the 
husband alone was entitled to rents and profits. 34 A United States bank-
31l Glendon, supra note 28, at 57. 
:11 But see id. at 58-59, discussing the disadvantages to the wife, particularly 
in the case of separation and divorce, that must be weighed against protection from 
creditors. A grant by a joint tenant to a third party, either voluntarily or involun-
tarily through levy and sale under execution, would create a tenancy in common. 
See id. at 56. 
32 In Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973), aft'd, 416 U.S. 953 
( 1974), a three-judge district court rejected an estranged wife's equal protection 
attack against a Massachusetts statute which prevented a tenant by the entirety 
from seeking partition of the property. The court indicated that the statute re-
flected "the legitimate state interests in preserving the right of survivorship of each 
spouse during marriage . . ." and noted that the parties knowingly chose the 
tenancy by the entirety over the other available forms of joint ownership subject 
to partition. [d. at 585. In effect, Klein concluded that there was no sex discrimi-
nation, since neither husband nor wife could see partition of a tenancy by the 
entirety. [d. at 586. See also Glendon, supra note 28, at 58-59; Wheeler, Domestic 
Relations, 1974 A1'iN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 1.4, at 3-13. 
In D'Ercole v. D'Ercole, 407 F. Supp. 1377 (D. Mass. 1976), the federal district 
court rejected a direct attack on the constitutionality of the tenancy by the entirety. 
Plaintiff wife, separated from her husband, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. at 1379. While conceding that the 
common law tenancy by the e.ntirety favored husbands over wives, the court denied 
relief on the basis that the commonwealth did not require a married couple to 
hold as tenants by the entirety but simply made the tenancy available as an 
option to be accepted or rejected as matter of choice. [d. at 1382. 
3:1 The Court expressly re$erved the issue of the applicability of the ERA in 
Krokyn v. Krokyn, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1417, 1429-30, 390 N.E.2d 733, 738-39. 
:H McDougall v. S & S of N.E., Inc., Middlesex Super. Ct. No. 78-711 (1978). 
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ruptcy judge ruled that the Massachusetts tenancy by the entirety, inso-
far as it allows attachment of a husband's interest in the tenancy but not 
the wife's, discriminates against creditors of the wife in violation of the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the Massachu-
setts ERA.35 Although the bankruptcy court decision was reversed on 
appeal to the United States District Court,36 the district court opinion 
reflected equal protection notions of earlier federal cases dealing with 
the federal constitutionality of the tenancy rather than with the under-
lying goals of a state ERA.37 Finally, however, the Massachusetts legis-
lature's action has resolved many of these problems. 
After undergoing a number of changes during its formative stages, the 
reform legislation was approved on November 13, 1979, as chapter 727 
of the Acts of 1979, entitled "An Act Equalizing the Rights of Husband 
and Wife in Property Held as Tenants by the Entirety." 38 The legisla-
tion seems to combine many of the advantages of joint tenancy-equal 
rights of both spouses in "rents, products, income or profits and to the 
control, management and possession of property held by them as tenants 
by the entirety" 3!l_and the advantage of the old tenancy by the entirety 
with respect to creditors: 
The interest of a debtor spouse in property held as tenants by the 
entirety shall not be subject to seizure or execution by a creditor of 
such debtor spouse so long as such property is the principal resi-
dence of the non-debtor spouse; provided, however, both spouses 
35 In re JaniS Ann Marie Harold, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1187 (1977). The issue 
came before the bankruptcy court by reason of a wife's bankruptcy petition in which 
she listed as exempt property her interest, as tenant by the entirety, in a residence 
with her husband. Federal law prior to the bankruptcy reform, effective October 
1, 1979, allowed a bankrupt to exempt all property which creditors could not reach 
under state law. 11 U.S.C. § IlO(a)(5), sec. 70(a)(5). The trustee in bankruptcy 
objected to the exemption, arguing that the Massachusetts rule constituted sex 
discrimination and filed a complaint to reach the interest claimed as exempt. 
36 The order of the bankruptcy court denying the bankrupt's motion to dismiss 
has been reversed on appeal. Harold v. Friedman, No. 78-484-S (D. Mass. Dec. 
3, 1979). The district court judge noted that the wife had not fraudulently trans-
ferred her property from a form reachable by creditors into a tenancy by the 
entirety and that "the exclusion of the wife's creditors from the opportunity to 
reach the property did not result from the operation of any gender biased policy 
of the state but by choice of the bankrupt and her husband." 
37 Compare Klein and V'Ercole, supra note 32, with the philosophy of an ERA 
as expressed supra, note 1. 
38 See note 26 supra. 
3U Acts of 1979, c. 727. Partition is apparently still unavailable in the new 
tenancy by the entirety. Neither party to the new tenancy may defeat the other's 
survivorship rights. In a jOint tenancy, survivorship may be defeated by either a 
voluntary or involuntary conveyance of one joint tenant. See Park, The New Ten-
ancy by the Entirety: More Questions than Answers, 8 MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY 
367 (Dec. 24, 1979). 
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shall be liable jOintly or severally for debts incurred on account of 
necessaries furnished to either spouse or to a member of their fam-
ily.40 
In redefining the creditor's ability to reach the property, the legislature 
thus has chosen to give to the husband the protection enjoyed only by 
the wife, rather than eliminate this protection altogether,41 an alternative 
it could have adopted.42 
In contrast to the protection from sex discrimination afforded by the 
state constitution, the amount of protection available under the four-
teenth amendment to the federal constitution is less clear. On the one 
hand, the United States Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr 43 condemned a 
40. Acts of 1979, c. 727. The new statute has also narrowed the protection 
from creditors which the old tenancy by the entirety offered to spouses. Protection 
is granted only in a principal residence held by the entirety, while the old tenancy 
had no such restriction. 
41 This problem is a familiar theme in judicial opinions in which a statute has 
been declared unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. Should the 
inequality be judicially remedied by extending the benefit of the statute to the 
deprived class, or should it be remedied by eliminating the benefit to all? This 
issue should properly be addressed in terms of legislative intent. For example, in 
the 1979 case of Orr v. Orr, supra note 19, in which Alabama's alimony statute was 
held discriminatory, the Supreme Court simply reversed the lower court decision 
upholding the statute. Alabama courts would thereafter have to decide whether 
the legislative intent in Alabama generally was that needy spouses should receive 
alimony, and thus make alimony available to both husbands and wives, or whe,ther 
the intent was that there should be no alimony unless it would be available to 
wives only. This decision is a question of state law, to be decided by the Alabama 
state courts. See Orr v. Orr on remand, 374 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979). 
42 The legisla,ture, in broadening the protection for husbands and wives in prin-
cipal residences owned by them as tenants by the entirety, has failed to address 
the overlapping protection from creditors granted by the Massachusetts homestead 
exemption. See G.L. c. 188, § 1, as most recently amended by chapter 756 of 
the Acts of 1979: 
An estate of homestead to the extent of fifty thousand dollars in the land 
and buildings may be acquired pursuant to this chapter by an owner of a 
home, or one who rightfully possesses premises by lease or otherwise, who 
has a family and occupies or intends to occupy said home as a principal resi-
dence; and such estate shall be exempt from the laws of conveyance, descent 
,and devise and from attachment, levy on execution and sale for the payment of 
his or her debts or legacies . . . . 
Regrettably, the legislature apparently sees tenancy by the entirety and homestead 
as separate issues, whereas they both serve "at present to protect a certain economic 
base for family life." Glendon, supra note 28, at 61; see generally Vukowioo, 
Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779 (1974). Reform of the tenancy by 
the entirety in view of the Massachusetts ERA, without also considering the addi-
tional impact of the homestead exemption, has only created confusion. The astute 
homeowner may now hold property as both tenant by the entirety and also declare 
a homestead, since the homestead statute permits "a sole owner, joint tenant, tenant 
by the entirety or tenant in common" to acquire a homestead. G.L. c. 188, § 1. 
43 444 U.S. 268 (1979). Orr was a 6-3 opinion, with Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissenting, not on the merits, but on jurisdictional 
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sex-based alimony statute which reHected outmoded, stereotypical, and 
paternalistic attitudes toward women.44 On the other hand, during the 
Survey year, the Court in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. 
Feeney 45 approved a statute which, while sex-neutral on its face was 
discriminatory in effect, thereby permitting a less obvious method of 
discrimination. 
By statute, Massachusetts provides that veterans eligible for appoint-
ment to state civil service positions are given preference over non-vet-
erans.46 Helen B. Feeney, a non-veteran, brought suit in federal court 
under section 1983 47 against state officials, arguing that the statutory 
preference for veterans violated the equal protection clause. She main-
tained that its grant of an absolute lifetime preference to veterans "in-
evitably operate[d] to exclude women from consideration for the best 
Massachusetts civil service jobs." 48 On its face, the Massachusetts stat-
ute is sex-neutral, because the term "veteran" is defined as "any person, 
issues. If Orr had simply presented the constitutionality of the Alabama alimony 
statute without the jurisdictional problems, the majority likely would have been 
larger. 
44 Massachusetts alimony statutes are sex-neutral. C.L. c. 208, § 34, permits 
alimony for either spouse. 
45 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
46 C.L. c. 31, § 23, recodified, effective in 1979, as C.L. c. 31, § 26. The 
statute in effect at the time of the Feeney litigation stated: 
The names of persons who pass examination for appointment to any pOSition 
classified under the civil service shall be placed upon the eligible lists in the 
following order: - (1) Disabled veterans ... in the order of their respective 
standing; ( 2) veterans in the order of their respective standing; (3) persons 
described in section 23B [the widow or widowed mother of a veteran killed 
in action or who died from a service-connected disability incurred in wartime 
service and who has not remarried] in the order of their respective standing; 
( 4) other applicants in the order of their respective standing. . . . A disabled 
veteran shall be retained in employment in preference to all other persons, in-
cluding veterans. 
442 U.S. at 263 n.lO. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads in part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the person injured in an action of law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceedings for redress. 
One of the more frequently-used federal civil rights statutes for the vindication of 
individual rights against state interference, § 1983 has recently come under attack 
by those seeking to narrow the scope of federal court intervention in this area. See, 
e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Paul v. 
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The 19'BOs may reveal a trend toward increasing 
reliance by litigants on state statutes to protect individual rights. See, e.g., Acts 
of 1979, c. 801, adding C.L. c. 12, §§ llH & 111, entitled "An Act for the Protection 
of the Civil Rights of Persons in the Commonwealth." 
48 442 U.S. at 259. 
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male or female. .' who . . . served in the army . . . [or] navy 
of the United States .... " 49 A three-judge federal district court 50 
found the Massachusetts statute unconstitutional, determining "that the 
absolute preference afforded by Massachusetts to veterans has a devas-
tating impact upon the employment opportunities of women." 51 On ap-
peal to the United States Supreme Court, the district court judgment was 
vacated.52 The case was remanded for further consideration in light of 
the intervening Supreme Court decision in Washington v. DaviY.53 In 
Davis, the Court had held that a statute, neutral on its face but which 
had a disproportionately adverse impact on blacks, could not violate the 
equal protection clause unless the impact could be attributed, at least in 
part, to purposeful racial discrimination. 54 Upon remand, in a two-to-one 
decision, the district court once again concluded that the Massachusetts 
statute was unconstitutional "because it favor[ed] a class from which 
women have traditionally been excluded, and ... the consequences of 
the Massachusetts absolute preference formula for the employment op-
portunities of women were too inevitable to have been 'unintended'." 55 
Appeal was taken once again to the United States Supreme Court. 
In a 7-2 opinion,56 the Court reversed and upheld the statute. The 
Court first noted that the veterans preference statute does not classify 
by gender, but by status as a veteran, a neutral classification including 
both men and women.5j The Court then considered whether the statute 
could be attributed to a state employment policy discriminatory toward 
women. 58 The Court found that the appellee failed to clear this hurdle 
49 C.L. c. 4, § 7. 
iiO 28 U.S.C. § 2281 provided that an aotion seeking injuctive relief against 
enforcement of state or federal statutes be heard by a special three-judge district 
court, with direct appellate review by the United States Supreme Court. With 
minor exceptions, Congress repealed the three-judge court statute in 1976, 90 Stat. 
2119 (1976). Hence, such an action would now be heard by a single-judge district 
court, with normal appellate review in a court of appeals. 
51 442 U.S. at 260. 
52 Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1976). 
53 426 U.S. 229 (1977). 
54 ld. at 238-44. 
55 442 U.S. at 260-61. 
56 Justice Stewart wrote for the majority. Justice Stevens concurred, joined by 
Justice White. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented. 
5j ld. at 275. If the statute were "overtly or covertly designed to prefer males 
over females in public employment [it] would require an exceeding persuasive jus-
tification to withstand a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." ld. at 273. 
58 In addition to relying upon Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1977), the 
Court also cited Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights the Court held that the refusal of a 
town to rezone an area to accommodate multi-family dwelling units was not 
unconstitutional even though the zoning refus.al would have a substantial impact 
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for two reasons. First, the Court accepted the district court's finding 
that the purpose of the statute was not discriminatory. It noted that he 
legislative goals were legitimate: "to reward veterans for the sacrifice 
of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to 
encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined peo-
ple to civil service occupation." 5n Second, the Court rejected Feeney's 
argument, accepted by the district court, that only a less sweeping form 
of veterans preference would be constitutional.6o It reasoned that if pur-
poseful discrimination had been a contributing factor in the statutory 
scheme, the scope of the preference would be irrelevant. "Invidious 
discrimination does not become less so because the discrimination accom-
plished is of a lesser magnitude. " Discriminatory intent is simply not 
amenable to calibration. It either is a factor that has influenced the 
legislative choice or it is not." III Accordingly, the Court found that the 
appellee failed to meet her burden, as established in Washington v. 
Davis, of demonstrating discriminatory intent.62 
Clearly, the Feeney opinion indicates that the Supreme Court, by 
imposing upon plaintiffs difficult eVidentiary burdens, will tolerate subtle 
forms of sex discrimination. Plaintiffs arguing discriminatory impact 
now must prove that a discriminatory intent shaped the development of 
a neutral statute, regardless of the impact of the statute upon a particular 
groUp.63 Future development of protection against sex discrimination, 
then, will be left to the states, which are free to interpret their own state 
constitutions 64 to prevent such discrimination. 
§7.4. Abortion-The Rights of Minors. During the Survey year the 
United States Supreme Court considered, for the second time,! the con-
on racial minorities. The respondents had not yet proven that "discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor" in the zoning decision. ld. at 270. 
59 442 U.S. at 265 (citation omitted). 
60 ld. at 276. In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, noted the 
more limited alternatives that were available, such as "a point reference system . . . 
or an absolute preference for a limited duration. . . ." ld. at 287-88. 
61 ld. at 277. 
62 ld. at 280. Proper allocation of the burden of proof was one of the disagree-
ments between the Court and the dissent. The dissent took the position that once 
a disproportionate impact on women was proven, as in the instant case, "the burden 
should rest on the State to establish that sex-based considerations played no part 
in the choice of the particular legislative scheme." ld. at 284. Under ·this view, 
the commonwealth had failed to meet its burden. 
63 See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. I, 130-41 
(1979). 
64 See § 1 supra. 
§7.4. 1 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). On the first occasion the Su-
preme Court avoided consideration of the merits. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 
132 (1976). 
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stitutionality of the Massachusetts parental consent abortion statute, 
chapter 112, section 12S.2 This statute requires parental or judicial 
consent before a non emergency abortion may be performed on an unmar-
ried minor. 3 Basing its opinion upon the 1973 landmark decisions of Roe 
v. 'Vade 4 and Doe v. Bolton 5 as further explicated in Planned Parenthood 
2 G.L. c. 112, § 12S. Prior to 1977 this section was numbered 12P. C. 112, 
§ 12S, read in relevant part: 
( 1) If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married, the 
consent of both the mother and her parents is required. If one or both of 
the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order 
of a judge of superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing as he 
deems necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian 
for the mother. 
If one of the parents has die.d or has deserted his or her family, consent by 
the remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted 
their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person having duties 
similar to a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of 
the mother is sufficient. 
For a summary of the tangled history of the challenge to the Massachusetts abortion 
statute, see Berney & Buchbinder, Constitutional Law, 1975 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 12.6, at 287-97; Ortwein, Constitutional Law, 1977 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § lOA, 
at 177-224. Prior to the effective date of the act, the constitutionality of the statute 
was challenged in federal court by a pregnant, unmarried minor, a doctor, a clinic, 
and the clinic's director. A three-judge district court declared § 12S unconstitutional. 
Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975). On direct appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded on the ground that the 
district court should have abstained from deciding the constitutional issues pending 
certification of issues of statutory construction to the Supreme Judicial Court. Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). Mter the Supreme Judicial Court answered the ques-
tions certified by the district court, Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 360 
N.E.2d 288 (1977), the district court stayed enforcement of the statute pending 
further proceedings. Baird v. Bellotti, 428 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1977). Subse-
quently, the district court once again declared the statute unconstitutional and en-
joined enforcement. Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (D. Mass. 1978). Upon 
direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment 
that the statute unconstitutionally burdened the right of a minor to obtain an abortion. 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 651. 
3 During the. Survey year the judiciary considered abortion-related questions in 
other contexts. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts 
clinic licensure statute. Baird v. Depal'tment of Public Health of the Comm. of 
Massachusetts, 599 F.2d 1098 (lst Cir. 1979). The district court had determined 
that the licensing provision unconstitutionally burdened the right of a woman to 
terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester without state interference. The 
court of appeals, however, held that the licensing provisions, which were applicable 
to all he.alth care facilities, were on their face reasonable regulations that do not 
significantly interfere with the right to an abortion during the first trimester of 
pregnancy. ld. at 1102. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In view of the 
United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 
(1979), decided within a month of the First Circuit Baird opinion, the analysis of 
the court of appeals is correot. The focus should be upon the extent to which the 
state has "unduly burden[edl the right to seek an abortion." 442 U.S. at 640. 
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe v. Wade did not recognize an absolute right to 
abortion on the part of the woman during the first and second trimesters. Although 
the fundamental right to abortion springs from the fourteenth amendment right 
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of Central Missouri v. Danforth,6 the Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird 7 
held that the Massachusetts statute unconstitutionally burdened the minor 
female's right to an abortion. 8 
In Bellotti, the Court, fragmenting 4-4-1, was unable to agree on a 
majority opinion, although eight justices agreed with the district court 
judgment that the Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional. Justice 
Powell wrote an opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Stewart and Rehnquist,9 in which he set out guidelines by which a state 
may constitutionally legislate restrictions on a minor's ability to obtain 
an abortion. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion, jOined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring only in the result. Justice 
Stevens viewed the Massachusetts statute as a more restrictive limita-
tion on a minor's abortion decision than the Missouri statute of which 
the Court disapproved in Danforth and characterized the Powell opinion 
as advisory.10 Justice White dissented.l1 Because the differences be-
tween these opinions bear potential significance for the future, the sepa-
rate opinions deserve a closer analysis. 
Justice Powell, after a brief reaffirmation of the now well-settled rule 
that children do not lose all constitutional rights simply because they are 
minors,12 explained that such rights, nevertheless, must be balanced 
ling state intexests "in preserving and protecting the he,alth of the pregnant woman." 
ld. at 163. For example, the decision to terminate a pregnancy is that of the woman 
and her doctor. ld. at 163-64. See discussion of "right of personhood" in L. TRIBE, 
AMElUCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15.10; see generally Note, Restrictions on Wom-
en's Right to Abortion: Informed Consent, Spousal Oonsent, and Recordkeeping 
Provisions, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 35 (1978). 
5 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
6 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In Danforth, the Court declared unconstitutional Mis-
souri's s,tatutory scheme which, inter alia, required written consent of the husband 
of a married woman seeking an abortion and written consent of one parent of an 
unmarried minor seeking an abortion. The Court found both the spousal and parental 
consent requirements unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade because "the State does 
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possible 
arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the 
patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." ld. at 
74 (emphasis added). 
7 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
8 ld. at 651. 
9 ld. at 624. 
9 ld. at 624. 
10 ld. at 656 n.4. 
n ld. at 656. 
12 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'!, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (access to 
contraceptives); Coss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public high school suspen-
sions); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969) (freedom of expression); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile delin-
quency proceedings); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial dis-
crimination in public schools). 
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against "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make 
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance 
of the parental role in childrearing." 13 He noted that appropriate con-
sideration of these factors may in certain instances result in application 
of the adult constitutional standard to minors, or conversely, in other 
instances, in the application of a lesser constitutional standard reflecting 
the special problems of minors.H Powell identified three interests which 
must properly be taken into account in order to determine the extent of 
constitutional protection accorded to minors: the interest of minors in 
exercising their rights; the state's interests in protecting the well-being 
of children-the parens patriae role of the state; 15 and the parents' inter-
est in controlling and rearing their children.16 Examining the state's 
parens patriae role, Powell observed that a state could restrict the actions 
of minors where those actions could produce serious detrimental conse-
quences for the minors.17 He noted, for instance, that in Ginsberg v. 
New York 18 the Court upheld a state ban on the sale of sexually oriented 
magazines to minors, even though their sale to adults would be constitu-
tionally protected.10 The ban was upheld because of New York's special 
interest in the well-being of children.20 After noting the type of situation 
in which the state would legitimately restrict the activity of minors, Jus-
tice Powell surveyed cases which recognize the constitutional rights of 
13 443 U.S. at 634. 
14 ld. at 634-35. For example, Justice Powell noted that the due process re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal proceedings applies 
equally into juvenile delinquency proceedings, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), 
while the constitutional right of trial by jury in criminal cases does not, McKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (l971). ld. 
15 The parens patriae power has been defined as the "inherent power and au-
thority of the state to exercise control over individuals who are deemed to lack 
capacity." Linn & Bowers, The Historical Fallacies Behind Legal Prohibitions of 
Marriages Involving Mentally Retarded Persons-the Eternal Child Grows Up, 13 
GONZ L. REv. 625, 637 (1978). 
16. 443 U.S. at 637. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), 
the Court relied on such cases in upholding Georgia's statutes that permit a parent 
to commit a child to a state mental institution without a prior adversary hearing. 
The Court assumed that the institutionalization process triggered due process liberty 
protection and held that the Georgia scheme provided all the process that was due. 
The Court noted that American constitutional law "historically has reflected Western 
Civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over 
minor children." ld. at 602. Inasmuch as Georgia had not given parents an 
absolute right to commit a minor child, since hospital staff were required to make 
an independent determination that the child was in need of commitment, the 
Georgia commitment process was held to satisfy the fourteenth amendment. ld. 
at 618-19. 
17 443 U.S. at 634-35. 
18 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
19 443 U.S. at 636. 
20 ld. 
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parents to guard their children both from governmental interference and 
from the potentially detrimental consequences of their own immature 
judgment.21 In so doing he remarked that "[l]egal restrictions on mi-
nors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important 
to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual 
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding." 22 
Having examined the various societal and parental interests at stake, 
Justice Powell then examined the Massachusetts abortion statute in order 
to determine whether the requirement of parental or judicial consent in 
connection with a minor's abortion request unduly burdened the right 
to abortion as recognized in Roe v. Wade. 23 By focusing on the serious 
consequences of restricting a minor's ability to have an abortion, Justice 
Powell effectively distinguished other permissible parental consent re-
quirements. He pointed out that, unlike a refusal of a parent to consent 
to the marriage of a child, a child's having an abortion would be irre-
versible once a certain stage of pregnancy was achieved. 24 He also noted 
that a minor mother would likely be less emotionally and financially able 
to care properly for a child.25 Thus, Justice Powell concluded that since 
section 12S required parental notification and consultation prior to a 
minor's undergoing a nonemergency abortion and since the judge was 
free to deny a mature and well-informed minor permission to obtain an 
abortion, the statute was an impermissible restraint on the right to an 
abortion.26 
Recognizing, nevertheless, the possibility that a pregnant minor could 
be unable to make a mature decision concerning an abortion, Powell 
proposed an alternative procedure which would permit parental input 
in the decision when necessary and at the same temper the absolute and 
pOSSibly arbitrary parental veto power.27 
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: 
( 1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make 
her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, indepen-
dently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to 
21 Id. at 637-38. 
22 Id. at 638-39. 
23 Id. at 639. 
24 Id. at 642. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 643. 
27 Id. It is this aspect of the Powell opinion that prompted Justice Stevens to 
characterize, it as advisory. Id. at n.32. Reacting to Justice Stevens's characteriza-
tion of his opinion as advisory, Justice Powell viewed his opinion as an "attempt 
to provide some guidance as to how a State constitutionally may provide for adult 
involvement-either by parents or a state official such as judge-in the abortion 
decisions of minors." Id. 
28
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make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in 
her best interests.28 
Without such a procedure, a defect analogous to the one condemned in 
the Missouri parental veto statute in Danforth would be present-a per 
se parental veto power over the woman's right to abortion, a power which 
even the state lacks. Justice Powell observed that 
many parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion, and 
young pregnant minors . . . are particularly vulnerable to their 
parents' efforts to obstruct both an abortion and their access to 
court. It would be unrealistic, therefore, to assume that the mere 
existence of a legal right to seek relief in superior court provides an 
effective avenue of relief for some of those who need it the most.29 
In determining how a judge is to assess the minor's best interest, Justice 
Powell was cognizant of the interest that the parents of the minor may 
have. He indicated that at least where there has been an on-going fam-
ily relationship 30 and the minor has been living with one of the f'arents, 
a judge would be permitted to conclude that it would be in the minor's 
best interest to require parental consultation prior to approving the 
abortion request. Under the Powell procedure, however, the minor must 
be able, if she so desires, to by-pass her parents completely and at least 
initiate a court proceeding without parental involvement. 3! In such a 
proceeding, if she is deemed mature, the court may not require parental 
involvement; if not mature, parents may become involved if the court 
determines it to be in her best interests.32 Thus, the procedure recom-
mended by Justice Powell would eliminate the absolute veto power of 
the pregnant minor's parents. 
The concurring opinion of Justice Stevens took the position that the 
Massachusetts statute was unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood, 
even though it was in part more flexible than was the Missouri statute 
condemned in Planned Parenthood.33 The Massachusetts statute pro-
vided for the alternative of judiCial approval of the abortion after par-
ental consent was refused, while Missouri had no comparable judiCial 
28 ld. at 643-44 (footnote omitted). Justice Powell indicated that the court 
hearing and any subsequent appeals should be handled expeditiously and anonym-
ously. ld. at 644. 
29 ld. at 647. 
30 ld. at 648. 
31 ld. 
32 ld. 
33 In one respect, the Massachusetts statute was more burdensome. Missouri 
required consent of only one parent, while Massachusetts required consent of both. 
ld. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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review procedure.34 In Justice Stevens's view, however, this distinction 
did not save the Massachusetts statute. According to Justice Stevens, 
section 12S was as great an intrusion upon the minor's abortion decision 
as was the Missouri provision, since the decision of the Massachusetts 
judge as to whether an abortion is in the minor's best interests 35 "must 
necessarily reflect personal and societal values and mores." 36 Such an 
absolute judicial veto power was, according to Justice Stevens, "funda-
mentally at odds" with the two privacy interests 37 that he found reflected 
in the abortion cases-one's interest in non-disclosure of personal mat-
ters 38 and one's interest in making important personal decisions without 
the intruding presence of government.3ll The minor's interest in abortion 
would reflect both of these privacy interests-keeping confidential, the 
entire matter associated with her pregnancy, and her interest in deciding 
whether to terminate the pregnancy without a state-imposed parental 
consent requirement. Thus, since Planned Parenthood established that 
a statutory scheme vesting absolute veto power over a minor's abortion 
decision in third parties unconstitutionally burdened the minor's abor-
tion, Justice Stevens believed that the Massachusetts statute, which he 
viewed as essentially absolute, should likewise be held unconstitutiona1.40 
Justice Stevens concluded by taking issue with the scope of the Powell 
opinion.41 He characterized Powell's proposal of alternative procedural 
guidelines as advisory in nature.42 The Court, said Justice Stevens, should 
hold section 12S unconstitutional under Planned Parenthood without 
elaborating on the constitutional parameters which a state may impose 
on a minor's abortion decision and the extent of permissible parental con-
sultation.43 
34 Id. 
35 In its advisory opinion interpreting § 125, the Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that the best interests standard should govern both the. parents' decision to grant 
consent and a court's decision whether to grant consent in the event of parental 
refusal. Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 747-48, 360 N.E.2d 288, 292-93. 
36 443 U.S. at 655. 
37 The term privacy, as used by the Court to characterize a particular zone of 
interests protected by the due process clause from governmental interference, has 
various meanings. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
38 For example, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court acknowledged that the growing 
phenomenon of governmental gathering and storage of information about individ-
uals, fueled by the computer revolution, presented issues of constitutional dimen-
sion. After balancing the various interests involved, however, the Whalen court 
upheld New York requirements that physicians who prescribed certain drugs for 
patients must report the names and address of the patients to the state for recording 
in a centralized computer bank. 429 U.S. at 603-04. 
39 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraceptives), and 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage). 429 U.S. at 601 n.W. 
40 443 U.S. at 656. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 656 n.4. 
43 Id. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/10
232 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §7.4 
In his dissent Justice White viewed the Court's decision as a broad-
ening of the Planned Parenthood rule,44 which had merely stated that 
vesting the abortion decision entirely with the minor's parents was un-
constitutional. He claimed that the Court's holding in Bellotti makes 
unconstitutional in certain circumstances a requirement of notice to 
parents prior to their daughters obtaining an abortion. 45 Furthermore, 
he considered that the Court's opinion prevented parents who were op-
posed to the abortion from having a voice in the court decision concern-
ing whether their daughter should have an abortion.46 
The issue of minors' abortion rights will certainly return to the Court 
as soon as state legislatures redraft their abortion statutes, most likely 
in a form consistent with Justice Powell's suggestions. The Powell opin-
ion, insofar as it seems to express the broadest view of permissible state 
regulation that will command the votes of a majority of the Court,47 
leaves open a number of policy questions which legislatures must face. 
The foremost of these will likely center on the proper role of the judicial 
system in the determination of whether the minor is sufficiently mature 
to make the abortion decision and if not, whether the abortion is in her 
best interests. Should a legislature grant the power to make these deter-
44 ld. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). By using the word "Court," Justice White 
apparently viewed the two other opinions filed in Bellotti as, at the minimum, 
proscribing absolute parental consent requirements and as limiting parental involve-
ment in a child's abortion decision to the procedure described by Justice Powell. 
See text at note 27. Justice Rehnquist, while joining both the Court's judgment 
and the plurality opinion of Justice Powell, indicated considerable support for 
White's position. He stated in a separate concurring opinion: "At such time as 
this Court is willing to reconsider its earlier decision in [Planned Parenthood] in 
which I joined the dissenting opinon of Mr. Justce White, I shall be more, than 
willing to participate in that task. But unless and until that time comes, literally 
thousands of judges cannot be left with nothing more than the guidance offered 
by a truly fragmented holding of this CoUN." Id. at 651-52 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring). 
45 ld. at 657. Justice White also dissented in Danforth, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. He expressed the view that a parental consent and 
consultation requirement was a reasonable method for a state "to protect children 
from their own immature and improvident decisions .... " 428 U.S. 52, 95 
(White, J., dissenting). 
46 433 U.S. at 6!f7. Justice Wlhite's summary of the result of Bellotti II is im-
precise. As Justice Stevens stated, concurring in the judgment, "[n]either Danforth 
nor this case determines the constitutionality of a statute which does no more than 
require notice to the parents, without affording them or any other third party an 
absolute veto." ld. at 654 n.!. 
47 If future cases involving state parental consent statutes meeting Justice 
Powell's requirements come before the Court, it is reasonable to anticipate that 
Jus.tice White would join Justice Powell, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart 
and Rehnquist in upholding such a statute. Such a vote would be consistent with 
his position that a state may constitutionally enact parental consent requirements. 
Hence, the Powell plurality opinion, rather than the Stevens' opinion, appears to 
be the one that will shape the future law on a minor's right to abortion. 
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minations to a court of general jurisdiction, as was the case in section 
12S? Alternatively, would a court that is more particularly oriented 
toward resolving issues involving minors and their best interests,48 such 
as a family, juvenile, or probate court,4U be the more appropriate forum? 
Should the legislature give these powers to a court at all, or should a 
less formal, more accessible non-judicial forum be chosen? 50 
In addition to the policy issues that it leaves unresolved, Justice 
Powell's "advisory" opinion itself poses another problem. In pursuit of 
guidance to legislatures as to the permissible scope of state regulation, 
Justice Powell has in effect drafted a model statute, one that will cer-
tainly be used not merely as a guide for legislation but as a model to be 
duplicated. Thus, there is a danger that the advantages of legislative 
creativity, reflected in the implementation by various states of differing 
and "experimental" procedures 51 for accommodating the just resolution 
of delicate and important issues in the life of a minor, may be stifled. 
§7.5. Right to Refuse Medical Treafinent. In 1977, the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saike-
wicz 1 that both competent and incompetent adults have a constitutional 
48 Family courts have long utilized the "best interests" formula in determining 
custody, visitation, and adoption questions involving children. In addition, most 
family courts have staff personnel-family service officers, probation officers, psy-
chiatrists, etc.-to investigate facts relevant to the best interests of the child. 
Time factors, of course, would most likely require that a court-ordered investiga-
tion, which may be more through in a custody dispute, be limited in the case of 
an abortion decision. The difficulty is that while an erroneous custody decision 
can always be reviewed by the court, at least prospectively, and a change of 
custody ordered, an erroneous decision of a court not to allow an abortion, with 
the resultant birth of a child, cannot be remedied. 
49 In many states, family court judges are more accessible during evenings and 
weekends than judges of courts of general jurisdiction. The easy access to family 
court judges should be a factor that should weigh in favor of a legislative choice 
of a family court forum to decide such abortion issues involving minors. 
50 Justice Powell commented: "We do not suggest, however, that a State, choosing 
to require parental consent could not delegate the alternative procedure to a juvenile 
court or an administrative agency or officer. Indeed, much can be said for em-
ploying procedures and a forum less formal than those associated with a court of 
general jurisdiction." 443 U.S. at 643 n.22. Justice Stevens beliveed that the 
court process might be inappropriate for resolution of the minor's abortion decision: 
"As a practical matter, I would suppose that the need to commence judicial pro-
ceedings in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden at least as 
great as, and probably greater than, that imposed on the minor child by the need 
to obtain the consent of a parent." ld. at 655. 
51 As Justice Brandeis noted in an oft-quoted passage: "It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, se.rve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
§7.5. 1 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
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right to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment absent state interests 
that may outweigh the individual interests in refusing such treatment. 
In Saikewicz, the Court indicated that in Massachusetts, the judiciary is 
a proper forum in which to determine whether an incompetent should 
receive treatment.2 The Court rejected the approach of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, which in the well-publicized Quinlan 3 case had left 
"the decision whether to continue artificial life support to the patient's 
guardian, family, attending doctors, and hospital 'ethics committee.''' 4 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court once again con-
fronted the difficult legal and philosophical problems arising out of the 
medical treatment issue. In Custody of a Minor,5 the Court examined 
the relationship between the parental prerogative to determine whether 
life-saving medical treatment will be provided for a child and the state 
interests in protecting the minor by requiring medical treatment over 
the parents' objections.6 In Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers,7 the 
Court focused upon a prisoner's interest in freedom of choice and the 
state's interest in compelling him to undergo life-saving medical treat-
ment.8 
In Custody of a Minor,9 the child's physician 10 filed a care and protec-
tion petition pursuant to chapter 119, section 24,11 in the juvenile session 
2 ld. at 756-59, 370 N.E.2d at 433-35. 
3 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). 
4 373 Mass. at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. 
5 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 379 N.E.2d at 1053. 
6 ld. at 2022, 379 N.E.2d at 1061. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2523, 399 N.E.2d 452. 
8 ld. at 2523-24, 399 N.E.2d at 453. 
9 '!be names of the parents and child were not disclosed in the opinion, in 
accordance with G.L. c. 119, § 38, which provides for the confidentiality of care 
and protection proceedings. This is the well-publicized Chad Green case. 
10 The case originally began in the probate court where the child's physician 
sought appointment as temporary guardian. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2002, 379 
N.E.2d at 1055. 
11 Chapter 119, § 24, permits juvenile courts and juvenile sessions of district 
courts 
upon the petition of any person alleging on behalf of a child under the age 
of eighteen years within the jurisdiction of said court that said child is with-
out necessary and proper physioal, educational or moral care and discipline, 
or is growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to a child's 
sound character development, or who lacks proper attention of parent, guard-
ian ,With care and custody, or custodian, and whose parents or guardian 
are unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide such care, may issue a 
precept to bring such child before said court, shall issue summonses to both 
parents of the child to show cause why the child should not be committed to 
the custody of the department or other appropriate ordea- Inade. . .. If, after 
a recitation under oath by the petitioner of the facts of the condition of the 
child who is the subject of ·the petition, the court is satisfied that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the cl1ild is suffering from serious abuse or 
neglect, or is in immediate danger of serious abuse or neglect, and that im-
mediate removal of the child is necessary to protect the child from serious 
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of a district court requesting that legal custody 12 of the child, then age 
two, be vested in the Department of Public Welfare in order to provide 
chemotherapy treatment for the child's leukemia condition.13 The dis-
trict court dismissed the petition and the' petitioner and the child's court-
appointed attorney claimed a trial de novo in the superior court.14 After 
a hearing, the judge ruled that chemotherapy treatment was necessary 
for the survival of the child and ordered that legal custody of the child 
be granted to the Department of Public Welfare to prOvide the treat-
ment.15 The parents, however, were to retain physical custody as long 
as they obeyed the court order.16 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the parents asserted that 
they had a constitutionally protected right to detennine appropriate 
medical care for the child and to choose an alternative treatment to 
chemotherapyY The Court refused to decide whether the state was 
constitutionally precluded from interfering with the parent's right to 
choose between various options of beneficial medical treatment for a 
child because the trial court found that "it was the parents' intention to 
disallow chemotherapy regardless of whether an alternative treatment 
program consistent with good medical practice could be found." 18 
Hence, in the Court's view, the issue before it was whether, on the evi-
dence, the superior court was correct in ordering the only treatment that 
could save the child's life, chemotherapy, despite the parental objec-
tions.19 
abuse or negle,ct, the court may issue an emergency order transferring custody 
of a child under this section to the department or to a licensed child care agency 
or individual described in clause (2) of section twenty-six. Said transfer of 
custody shall be for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours. Upon the 
entry of the order a date for a hearing on the extension of the order shall be 
set, which date shall fall within the seventy-two hour period. 
Id. 
12 Custody is a fluid concept, referring to a variety of rights and duties. It may 
include such matters as with whom the ohild lives (physical custody) and who 
has the obligation ,to care for the child and make decisions concerning his or her 
education, religious training, and medical care (legal custody). One or both parents, 
a third party or a social service agency may be given rights in regard to one or a 
combination of such matters, or the parents may share them (joint custody). See 
generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 17.2 (1968). 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2003, 379 N.E.2d at 1055. 
14 Id. at: 2003-04, 379 N.E.2d at 1055. 
15 Id. at 2004, 379 N.E.2d at 1055-56. 
16 Id. at 2004, 379 N.E.2d at 1056. 
17 Id. The parents also raised various procedural objections to the proceedings in 
the lower courts, all of which were unsuccessful. Id. at 2005, 379 N.E.2d at 1056. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. The evidence at trial revealed that chemotherapy was the only effective 
medical treatment for the disease which affected the child-acute lymphocytic 
leukemia, which, if untreated, would be fatal. Id. at 2006-07, 379 N.E.2d at 1057. 
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The Court noted that the question of whether and to what extent a 
state could order medical treatment for a child over parental objections, 
while one of first impression in the commonwealth, had been addressed 
by many other jurisdictions.2o These jurisdictions decided the question 
by balancing three competing interests: ( 1) the "natural rights" of the 
parents, (2) the personal needs of the child, and (3) the responsibilities 
of the state.21 After weighing these interests, these courts have uniformly 
permitted state intervention where the medical treatment sought was 
necessary to save the child's life.22 The Supreme Judicial Court, adopt-
ing this interest-weighing approach, concluded that such a result was 
appropriate in this case.23 
Focusing initially on parental rights, the Supreme Judicial Court rec-
ognized the primary right of parents "to raise their children according 
to the dictates of their own consciences." 24 It noted that courts have 
treated this parental prerogative with great deference.25 The Court 
recognized, however, that parental rights are not absolute, but at some 
point must yield to [he state interests in the well-being of children, 
espeCially when the child's survival is at stake.26 It observed that under 
chapter 119, section 24,27 a parent may be deprived of custody where 
the child has not received "necessary and proper physical care" and 
where the parents are "unwilling, incompetent, or unavailable to provide 
such care." 28 Given the trial court's findings that the child would die 
without chemotherapy treatment, that the risks of treatment were mini-
mal, and that the parents had refused to allow continuation of the ther-
apy, the Court concluded that the evidence supported the judge's finding 
that the parent's refusal to authorize chemotherapy constituted a failure 
to provide proper physical care. 29 
The Court then examined the second of the three interests relevant 
to the proper resolution of the issue, those of the child. In order to as-
certain the actual needs of the child, the Court utilized the best interests 
20 ld. at 2022, 379 N.E.2d at 1061. See cases cited at id. at 2022 n.8, 379 N.E.2d 
at 1062 n.8. 
21 ld. at 2022, 379 N.E.2d at 1061-62 (citing Note, State Intrusion into Family 
Affairs: Justifications and LimitatiOns, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974». 
22 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2022, 379 N.E.2d at 1062. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. at 2023, 379 N.E.2d at 1062. The Court seemed to have recognized a 
constitutional basis for this parental right. ld. (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 
U.S. 246 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972». 
25 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2024, 379 N.E.2d at 1062. 
26 ld. at 2025, 379 N.E.2d at 1063. 
27 For the text of § 24 see note 11 supra. 
28 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2026, 379 N.E.2d at 1063. 
29 ld. at 2027-28, 379 N.E.2d at 1063. 
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standard, which "requires a court to focus on the various factors unique 
to the situation of the individual for whom it must act." 30 Applying the 
best interests test, the Court found that the evidence before he trial judge 
amply supported the order requiring chemotherapy.31 
Finally, the Court considered the interests of the state that would 
support court-ordered medical treatment over parental objection. It 
found that the state's interests in the welfare of children living within its 
borders, in the preservation of life, and in the ethical integrity of the 
medical profession all justified the judge's order.32 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the interests of the child and of the state outweighed the 
parental prerogative to select the medical treatment for their child.33 
Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers 34 involved another disagree-
ment concerning the right to refuse a specific medical treatment. In 
this case, the conflict arose between the state's prison authorities and a 
competent adult prisoner who declined to receive life-saving hemo-
dialysis treatments for kidney disease.35 The Commissioner of Correc-
tions initiated proceedings in superior court to compel the defendant 
prisoner to undergo these treatments.36 After an evidentiary hearing, 
the superior court judge found that without dialysis, Myers could survive 
no longer than fifteen days.3i He also found that Myers's refusal of treat-
ment was based neither on religiOUS factors, nor on a desire to die.38 
Rather, the judge determined that his refusal was an expression of pro-
test at having been incarcerated in a medium security rather than a 
minimum security prison.3n He also found that the side effects of dialysis 
30 ld. at 2033, 379 N .E.2d at 1065. The trial judge utilized the "substituted 
judgment" test, which requires that "a court acting on behalf on an incompetent 
person must first attempt to 'don the mental mantle' of that person. . .. [T]he 
doctrine . . . seeks to ensure that the personal decisions concerning the conduct of 
individual affairs remain, to the greatest extent possible, with the individual." ld. 
at 2032, 379 N.E.2d at 1065 (quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417). 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court phrased the appropriate test with regard to a 
child incompetent due to age, as that of the child's best interests, it indicated that 
the two tests were essentially the same. ld. at 2033, 379 N.E.2d at 1065. 
31 ld. 
32 ld. at 2035-37, 379 N.E.2d at 1066. 
33 ld. at 2037, 379 N.E.2d at 1067. 
34 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2523, 399 N.E.2d 452. 
35 ld. at 2525, 399 N.E.2d at 453. Hemodialysis is "a procedure whereby blood 
is pumped out of the body, cleansed of its toxins by a mechanical filtering process, 
and then returned to the body." ld. at 2525, 399 N.E.2d at 454. 
36 ld. at 2524, 399 N.E.2d at 453. 
37 ld. at 2525, 399 N.E.2d at 454. 
38 ld. at 2526, 399 N.E.2d at 454. The defendant believed that dialysis weak-
ened him physically and thus "reduced his ability to defend himself against other 
inmates." ld. 
39 ld. 
36
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were not severe and, with regular dialysis and related medical treatment, 
Myers could lead a normal life.40 After finding that coerced dialysis 
could be effectuated by "employing a combination of mechanical and 
human restraints," the judge ordered the treatment.41 The trial judge 
reported the case to the Appeals Court, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
granted the plaintiff's application for direct appellate review.42 
On appeal, Myers argued that court-ordered treatment violated his 
constitutional rights of privacy and bodily integrity.43 Acknowledging 
the defendant's constitutional right to refuse treatment, the Court noted, 
however, that this right was not absolute, but was dependent on a bal-
ancing of the individual's interests against those of the state.44 Referring 
to the four state interests recognized in Saikewicz,45 the Court deter-
mined that only the state interests in preserving life and in maintaining 
the ethical standards of the medical profession were relevant. 4G Distin-
guishing Myers's situation from that posed in the Saikewicz case, where 
chemotherapy could only briefly prolong the patient's life, the Court 
determined that Myers could lead a normal and healthy life as long as 
dialysis and concomitant medications were administered.47 The Court 
admitted that the complexities of dialysis and the excessive time burdens 
that treatment requires are significant intrusions on the individual's con-
stitutionally protected right to bodily integrity. 48 The Court noted, 
however, that incarceration could impose limitations on those rights in 
40 ld. 
41 ld. at 2526-27, 399 N.E.2d at 454-55. 
42 ld. at 2523, 399 N.E.2d at 453. 
43 ld. at 2524, 399 N.E.2d at 453. The defendant also argued that the issue 
was moot because he had in the interim received a kidney transplant, thereby 
making it unlikely that he would need dialysis in the future. Finding that the 
kidney transplant might prove unsuccessful and thus require future dialYSiS, the 
Court rejected the mootness claim. ld. at 2527, 399 N.E.2d at 455. In addition, 
it noted that the issue was one "of public importance, capable of repetition, yet 
evading review." ld. at 2528, 399 N.E.2d at 455. 
44 ld. at 2528, 399 N.E.2d at 455-56. 
45 See text at note 1 supra. The four interests identified by the Saikewicz Court 
were (1) the preservation of life, (2) the protection of the interests of innocent 
third parties, (3) the prevention of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the integrity 
of the medical profession. 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2529, 399 N.E.2d at 456. 
46 ld. Because the defendant was unmarried and without dependents, and be-
cause his refusal of treatment could not be considered suicide, the Court considered 
the second and third factors irrelevant. ld. 
47 ld. at 2530, 399 N.E.2d at 456. 
48 ld. at 2531, 399 N.E.2d at 457. One may speculate whether the Court would 
consider financial considerations relevant to the decision. The Court may instinc-
tively reaot negatively to a lower court decision allowing life-sustaining treatment 
to end because of the expense involved. The second state interest identified in 
Saikewicz, note 45 supra-the interests of family who may be financially dependent 
on the patient- could be used as a basis to end treatment in a case where con-
tinuation of treatment would constitute a severe economic strain on the family. 
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terms of the state's interest in the administration of its prison system.49 
In this instance, the Court concluded that the interest of the state should 
prevai1.5o Specifically, the Court accepted the Commissioner's position 51 
that permitting Myers to die would create an intolerable prison atmos-
phere in which the credibility of prison administrators' commitment to 
inmate health would be seriously jeopardized and likely would cause 
other prisoners "to attempt similar forms of coercion in order to attain 
illegitimate ends." li2 Finally, the Court found that the state interest 
in fostering medical ethical standards weighed in favor of coerced dialysis 
treatment.53 Testimony before the trial court had established that medi-
cal ethics require life-saving treatment under circumstances where regu-
lar treatment would result in a normal life for the patient. 54 Hence, 
the Court concluded that the superior court order that the Commissioner 
could compel forced treatment of Myers should be affirmed.li5 
§7.6. First Amendment-Municipal Free Speech. More frequent use 
of the public referendum process as a mechanism for determining public 
views on controversial issues has led to greater participation by corpo-
49 ld. 
50 ld. The Court characterized the relationship between the state and individual 
interests as "a very close balance of interests." ld. 
51 The following excerpts from the Commissioner's affidavit are relevant: 
In my opinion, to allow Myers, or other inmates in similar situations, to de-
stroy themselves while in prison would create very serious practical problems 
in prison administration .. " [Ilt would be very difficult to make the prison-
ers, their families and the correction department staff understand that I had 
done everything legally possible to prevent a death of a prisoner in my charge. 
Faith in the correctional system's ability tOlrotect inmates would be seriously 
undermined. More immediately, one cour expect an explosive reaction by 
other inmates to the death and to the failure of the Commissioner to prevent 
it by simply releasing Myers to minimum security. In my opinion, such a 
reaction is much more likely in a situation where Myers is permitted to die, 
than where he i~ subjeoted to involuntary treatment to keep him alive. 
ld. at 2535, 399 N.E.2d at 459. 
52 ld. at 2532, 399 N.E.2d at 457 (footnote omitted). 
53 ld. 
M 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2532-33, 399 N .E.2d at 458. 
55 ld. at 2533, 399 N.E.2d at 458. A noteworthy statutory development in the 
field of patients' rights was the enactment in 1979 of the so-called "Patients' Bill 
of Rights." Acts of 1979, c. 214. The act permits a civil action for damages or 
other relief where patients in hospitals and in other health care facilities have been 
denied certain specified rights, including, "the right to freedom of choice in . . . 
[the] selection of a facility, or a physician or health service mode;" the right "to 
refuse to be examined, observed, or treated by students or any facility staff without 
jeopardizing access to psychiatric, psychological, or other medical care and atten-
tion;" the right "to refuse to serve as a research subject and to refuse any care or 
examination when the primary purpose is educational or informational rather than 
therapeutic;" the right "to privacy during medical treatment or other rendering of 
care within the capacitx of ,the faCility;" the right "to informed consent to the 
extent provided by law.' ld. 
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rations in the referendum process.1 U nti! recently, legislation in many 
states, including Massachusetts, limited corporate participation in the 
discussion of referenda issues to those issues directly related to the 
business of the corporation.2 In the 1978 decision of First National 
Bank v. Bellotti,3 however, the United States Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute mandating such a restriction.4 
During the Survey year, in Anderson v. City of Boston,5 the Supreme 
Judicial Court, distinguishing the state's interest in regulating the speeoh 
of business corporations from its interest in regulating the speech of 
municipal corporations, upheld a statutory restriction on a municipality's 
expenditure of public funds to express its views on various referenda 
proposals.6 
Because the Court in Anderson used Bellotti as a foundation for its 
decision, a brief review of the Bellotti opinion is helpful for a proper 
understanding of Anderson. At issue in Bellotti was the validity of 
chapter 55, section 8,j which prohibited banks and business corporations 
§7.6. 1 Although the General Court has the legislative power, article 48 of the 
amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution reserves to the people a modicum 
of legislative power through the "popular initiative" and the "popular referendum." 
Under the "popular initiative" procedure, "a specified number of voters" may 
submit to the legislature proposals for laws and constitutional amendments, with 
certain areas excepted. Under the "popular referendum" procedure, "a specified 
number of voters" is empowered to petition the Secretary of State to submit to the 
voters for their approval or rejection, again with certain exceptions, laws enacted by 
the legislature. MASS. CONST. art. amend. 48. 
2 See, e.g., G.L. c. 55, § 8, infra note 7. Legislation restricting corporate political 
activity was in effect in 31 other states at the same time of the Bellotti decision. 
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 803 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
3 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For an in-depth analysis of BelkJtti, see Ortwein, Con-
stitutional Law, 1977 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAw § 10.3, at 177-224. For analysis of 
both Bellotti and Anderson, see Ryan, Municipal Free Speech: Banned in Boston?, 
47 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111 (1979). 
01 Id. at 768-69 n.2. 
5 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 380 N.E.2d 629. 
6 Id. at 2313-14, 380 N.E.2d at 638. 
j G.L. c. 55, § 8 reads in part: 
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, trust, surety, indemnity, 
safe deposit, insurance, railroad, street railway, telegraph, telephone, gas, elec-
tric light, heat, power, canal, aqueduct, or water company, no company having 
the right to take land by eminent domain or to exercise franchises in public 
ways, granted by the commonwealth or by any county, city, or town, no 
trustee or trustees owning or holding the majority of the stock of such a cor-
poration, no business corporation incorporated under the laws of or doing 
business in the commonwealth and no officer or agent acting in behalf of any 
corporation mentioned in this section, shall directly or indirectly give, pay, 
expend or contribute, or promise to give, pay, expend or contribute, any money 
or other valuable thing for the purpose of aiding, promoting or preventing the 
nomination or election of any person to public office, or aiding, promoting or 
antagonizing the interests of any political party, or influenCing or affectig the 
vote on any questions, submitted to the voters, other than one materially af-
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from making expenditures or contributions for the purpose of influenc-
ing the vote on referendum questions that did not "materially affect" 
the business, property, or assets of the corporation.R The statute further 
stipulated that a ballot question "solely concerning the taxation of the 
income, property or transactions of individuals shall [not] be deemed 
materially to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation." 9 
The plaintiffs, two national banking associations and three business 
corporations, attacked the constitutionality of the statute, alleging that 
this prohibition impermissibly infringed upon their first amendment 
rights of free speech.]O Distinguishing the first amendment rights of a 
natural person from the more limited rights of a corporation, the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that a corporation could claim first amend-
ment protection for its political speech only where the issue at hand 
materially affected the corporation's business.ll 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the Massachusetts restriction constituted "an impermissible legislative 
prohibition of speech."]2 The Court determined that the issue before 
it was not the nature of the speaker but the nature of the speech. is 
Had the speaker not been a corporation, the Court noted, it could not 
have been argued that the proposed speech lacked first amendment 
protection, since free speech on public issues is clearly "indispensable 
to decision making in a democracy." 14 The speaker's identity as a 
corporation is not enough to change this result. The Court emphasized 
that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public" remains the same whether the source is an in-
dividual or a corporation.]5 The Court also noted the first amendment's 
role in protecting both the rights of the public to hear speech on matters 
of public concern and of citizens to speak on such matters.16 
fecting any of the, property, business or assets of the corporation. No ques-
tion submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the income, 
property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to affect the 
property, business or assets of the corporation . . . . 
8 Id. 
9 Id.. 
10 435 U.S. at 770. 
11 First Nat'l Bank v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 773, 785, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 
1270. 
12 435 U.S. at 784 (1978). 
13 Id. at 776. 
14 Id. at 777. The extent to which corporate and individual first amendment 
rights are coextensive was an issue reserved by the Court. Id. at 777-78 n.13. 
For a general discussion of constitutional rights of corporations and Bellotti, see 
O'Kelley, The COl18titutional Rights of CorporatiOl18 Revisited: Social and Political 
Expression and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 
1346 (1979). 
15 435 U.S. at 777. 
16 Id. at 783. 
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In reaching its decision the Court rejected two justifications advanced 
by the state for its prohibition of corporate speech. First, the state 
argued that corporate participation in the referendum process would 
exert undue influence on the eventual vote and thereby erode citizens' 
confidence in the democratic process.1' Second, the state maintained 
that the restriction on speech was necessary to protect those shareholders 
whose views differed from those expressed by management on behalf 
of the corporation.1s With respect to the first justification, the Court 
acknowledged the strong governmental interests in preservation of "the 
integrity of the electoral process." 1ll It found no evidence in the record, 
however, that corporate involvement in the referendum process would 
have an "overwhelming or even significant" effect on a referendum 
issue.20 Furthermore, noted the Court, "the concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the first amend-
ment .... " 21 With regard to the second justification, the Court found 
the statute so under-inclusive 22 and over-inclusive 23 that the purported 
17 ld. at 789. 
18 ld. at 787. 
19 ld. at 788. The Court distinguished the situation of corporate speech in the 
context of a partisan candidate election, where spending limitations may serve to 
minimize the problem of corruption: 
[Ojur consideration of a corporation's right to speak on issues of general 
public interest implies no comparable right in the quite different context of 
participation in a political campaign for election to public office. Congress 
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent 
corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candidate 
elections. 
ld. at n.26. 
20 ld. at 789. The state also argued that the corporate restriction encourages 
greate.r citizen participation in the process of lawmaking through the referendum 
process. The Court rejected the argument, emphasizing the need for diversity of 
views on public issues. ld. at 790, n.29. 
21 ld. at 790-91 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (1976)). " [Tjhe 
fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: 
The Constitution 'protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is 
unconvincing.' " 
22 ld. at 793. The. Court found the under-inclusiveness of the statute demon-
strated by its failure to prohibit either corporate lobbying with respect to legislation 
or corporate speech on public issues not yet the subject of a referendum, even 
though both situations involve expenditure of corporate funds and expression of 
views with which some shareholders would likely disagree. In addition, the statu-
tory reference to income taxation (see note 7 supra) suggested that the legislature's 
actual purpose was to silence corporations on the controversial issue of a graduated 
state income tax. Thus, it was not reflective of a legislative goal of protecting 
shareholders. ld. 
23 ld. at 794. The Court found the over-inclusiveness of the statute demon-
strated by its prohibition of corporation advocacy on a referendum issue even in 
cases where the shareholders unanimously agreed upon such advocacy. ld. at 795 
(citation omitted). 
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goal of protecting the corporate shareholder was illusory.24 Hence, the 
Court concluded that the state had advanced no compelling state inter-
est to justify the statute.25 
It did not take long for the business community to take advantage 
of the opportunities afforded by Bellotti. Armed with the new decision, 
several large business corporations, including two of those involved in 
Bellotti,26 organized a campaign against a proposed amendment to the 
state constitution which, they believed, would greatly increase the 
property tax burden shouldered by business. The amendment, popu-
larly known as the classification amendment, was designed to reduce 
the adverse effect of one hundred percent property evaluation on home-
owners and preserve their traditional tax advantage over businesses by 
amending the state constitution to allow property to be taxed at dif-
ferent percentages of the market value, depending upon how the prop-
erty is used.27 The mayor of Boston, arguing that Bellotti conferred 
upon municipal corporations the same first amendment rights as those 
given to business corporations, secured approval of an ordinance au-
thorizing the expenditure of municipal funds to promote the passage of 
the amendment.28 Eleven taxpayers challenged the expenditures in an 
action commenced directly in the Supreme Judicial Court.29 Six days 
after oral argument, the Court issued an order enjoining the city from 
expending the appropriated funds and prohibiting the city from com-
pelling municipal employees to spend working hours in aid of the city's 
quest for passage of the classification amendment.3o The Court ex-
plained its reasoning in the subsequently issued Anderson opinion. 
24 ld. at 793. 
25 ld. at 795. 
26 Wall Street J., Oct. 27, 1978, at 22, col. 3. 
27 For a description of the constitutional amendment, ratified on November 7, 
1978, and associated legislation, see Opinion of the Justices, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1756, 
393 N.E.2d 306 and Associated Indus. of Mass. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 2027, 393 N.E.2d 812. The classification amendment, which be-
came article 112 of the amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, gives the 
legislature the additional power to "classify real property according to its use in 
no more than four classes and assess, rate and tax such property differently in the 
classes so established, but proportionately in the same class, . . . except that rea-
sonable exemptions may be granted." 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2028, 393 N.E.2d 
at 813. Prior to the. amendment, the legislature could not tax classes of real prop-
erty at different rates. ld. 
28 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2299, 380 N.E.2d at 631. Pursuant to the ordinance, 
money was allocated towards the establishment of an office of public information 
on classification. Its purpose was to disseminate information to the public urging 
the adoption of the, amendment and to assist in the organization of citizen volunteer 
groups supporting such a goal. The city also intended to provide office space and 
telephones to volunteers. ld. 
29 See C.L. c. 231A and c. 40, § 53. 
30 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2301, 380 N.E.2d at 632. 
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In support of its issuance of the injunction, the Court noted initially 
that a municipality has no authority to appropriate funds to influence 
state referenda.31 It reached this conclusion based upon its construction 
of the broad state election financing laws.32 Under the commonwealth's 
home rule amendment,33 a municipality may exercise by ordinance or 
by-law any power or function not inconsistent with laws enacted by the 
legislature under the powers reserved to it hy the amendment.s4 The 
Court interpreted the comprehensive nature of chapter 55 and its elec-
tion financing regulations as reflecting a legislative intention to reach 
all political contributions and expenditures within the commonwealth.35 
Hence, it concluded that any exercise of power by a municipality in 
this area would interfere with the legislative design and thereby violate 
the home rule amendment.30 Consequently, the Court held that the state 
constitution and relevant statutes precluded the city from appropriating 
public funds for the purpose of influencing the referendum question.37 
After concluding that the city lacked the authority to appropriate 
funds to influence the outcome of the referendum, the Court considered 
the city's argument that despite the legislative ban on corporate expendi-
tures, the Bellotti decision established a municipality's constitutional 
right to speak on such matters. 38 The Court declined to consider the 
broad question of the scope of a municipality's first amendment rights.s9 
Instead, the Court framed the issue as one of whether the common-
wealth's denial of the city's right to expend funds in this manner 
abridged speech which the first amendment was designed to protect.40 
As did the Supreme Court in Bellotti, the Supreme Judicial Court de-
cided the issue by balancing the interests involved.41 In contrast to 
the decision of the Bellotti court, however, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found the state interests advanced sufficiently compelling to allow the 
31 Id. at 2302, 380 N.E.2d at 632. 
32 Id. 
33 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89, § 6, reads in part: 
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local 
ordinances or by-laws, exercise any power or function which the general court 
has power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or 
laws enacted by the general court in conformity with [its] powers .... 
34 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2304, 380 N.E.2d at 633. 
35 The Court viewed the absence of specific reference to a municipal corporation 
in the statute not as an indication of the legislature's intent to authorize expenditures 
by municipalities, but rather as an indication that "the Legislature did not even 
contemplate that such action could occur." Id. at 2306, 380 N.E.2d at 634. 
30 Id. at 2305, 380 N.E.2d at 633. 
37 Id. at 2302, 380 N.E.2d at 632. 
38 Id. at 2309, 380 N.E.2d at 635. 
39 Id. at 2313, 380 N.E.2d at 637-38. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2313-14, 380 N.E.2d at 638. 
43
Perlin: Chapter 7: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§7.6 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 
restrictions on municipal speech to withstand strict scrutiny.42 Citing 
article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,43 the Court found 
that the state had a "compelling interest in assuring the fairness of 
elections and the appearance of fairness in the electoral process." 44 The 
Court also found that the state had a compelling interest "in assuring 
that a dissenting minority of taxpayers . . . [were] not compelled to 
finance" the expenditure of public funds for municipal advocacy with 
which they disagreeed.4il Hence, the Court concluded that the common-
wealth did demonstrate compelling interests justifying the legislative 
determination that neither the state not its political subdivisions should 
expend funds in order to participate as advocates in the referendum 
process.46 
Having upheld the constitutionality of the restriction, the Court then 
turned to the issue of the relief to be granted.47 The Court granted 
the plaintiffs' request for an order enjoining the city from expending 
funds for the purpose of influencing the vote on the classification 
amendment.48 The order enjoined the city from using municipal tele-
phones, printing materials, and facilities to promote the classification 
amendment, "at least unless each side were [sic] given equal represen-
tation and access." 4!J The Court refused, however, to enjoin municipal 
employees from voluntary activity on behalf of the amendment during 
working hours, because there was little information in the record con-
cerning the activities of city employees on behalf of the campaign.50 
Thus, the Court prudently avoided the troublesome issue of the extent 
to which "city employees may have certain rights of speech, even during 
working hours .... " 51 
42 ld. 
43 Mass. Const. art. 9 provides in part that "[alll elections ought to be free." 
HId. at 2315, 380 N.E.2d at 638. The Court also noted that the state constitu-
tion demands a fair referendum process by requiring the secretary of the common-
wealth to send tp the voters the full text of the referendum proposal, copies of 
both the majority and minority legisla'tive committee reports, "a statement of the 
votes of the. general. court on the measure, and fair, concise summary of the 
measure ... [andl other information and arguments for and against the measure." 
ld. at 2315-16, 380 N.E.2d at 638. 
45 ld. at 2318-19, 380 N.E.2d at 639. 
46 ld. at 2314-15, 380 N.E.2d at 637-38. 
HId. at 2320, 380 N.E.2d at 640. 
48 ld. at 2321, 380 N.E.2d at 640. 
49 ld. at 2323, 380 N.E.2d at 641. 
50 ld. 
51 ld. at 2322, 380 N.E.2d at 641. Aggrieved by the decision of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, the city sought a stay of the judgment from Justice Brennan in his 
capacity as Circuit Justice, pending disposition of its appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1389 (1978). Believing 
that the Court would hear the case, Justice, Brennan issued a stay on October 20, 
1978, id. at 1391, thereby enabling the city to spend the appropriated funds to 
44
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In analyzing the first amendment issue presented in Anderson, the 
Supreme Judicial Court implicitly accepted the language of Bellotti 
emphasizing the first amendment's purpose of promoting open and in-
formed public discussion.52 Clearly, the information sought to be 
conveyed by the city would have little difficulty satisfying such a 
standard. The validity of the distinction between speech by a private, 
rather than a municipal, corporation-a distinction which one may 
reasonably draw from Anderson-must rest on the degree of scrutiny 
given to the interests advanced for regulating the speech or on an 
assessment of the differing state interests in regulating municipal speech. 
The Anderson Court itself noted that the proffered state interests, 
although similar to those rejected by the Supreme Court in Bellotti, 
had to be evaluated in the context of a municipal expenditure of public 
funds to champion a cause supported by those in control of the municipal 
treasury.53 
Traditionally, the first amendment has been viewed as the guardian 
of individual expression against governmental interference. 54 Whether 
the amendment also serves to grant government certain rights of ex-
pression has received little attention from the courts or commentators.55 
Those who have explored the area note that governmental speech, 
although an indispensable part of the system of communication, brings 
with it special problems requiring special protection.56 As Professor 
Emerson has noted, governmental speech has the potential of becoming 
so pervasive that it may overpower critical and opposing views.57 In 
addition, there is something inherently inappropriate about allowing 
a municipality, a mere creature of state law which draws its power 
from the people, to spend the people's money to tell the people how 
to vote.58 The question remains, however, whether these potential 
problems are sufficient to distinguish municipal corporate speech from 
private corporate speech. 
support the referendum proposal until further order of the. Supreme Court. Ap-
pellants moved thereafter before the full Court to vacate Justice Brennan's stay 
orde.r, and with three justices dissenting, the motion was denied on November 6, 
1978. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 951 (1978). Hence, the City of 
Boston was able to spend funds in support of the referendum question during the 
crucial pre-voting period. On January 8, 1979, after the refe.rendum proposal had 
been approved by the voters, the Court dismissed the city's appeal for want of 
a substantial federal question. City of Boston v. Anderson, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979). 
52 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2313, 380 N.E.2d at 637-38. 
53 ld. at 2314-15, 380 N.E.2d at 638. 
54 See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
55 See generally 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2310-11 n.12, 380 N.E.2d at 635-36 
n.12; Z. CHAFFEE, 2 GoVERNMENT AND MASS CoMMUNICATION, at 723 (1947). 
50 T.I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, at 19 (1970). 
57 ld. at 698. 
58 ld. 
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Significantly, many of these fears were raised by the state and 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Bellotti. In Bellotti it was asserted 
that corporate speech would overwhelm the electorate, given the vast 
financial and persuasive powers of the modern corporation, and thereby 
diminish the citizens' confidence in the referendum process.59 Unlike 
the Anderson Court, however, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered such fears speculative unless supported by legislative findings 
or evidence in the record.~o The Supreme Court also rejected the 
"highly paternalistic" 61 state interest of providing a balanced debate by 
suppressing what it believed was the more powerful corporate voice.62 
The Court placed with the people, and not the state, the responsibility 
for weighing the value of the competing arguments.63 Regulating 
speech for the purported benefit of the people, according to the Su-
preme Court, actually serves to defeat the first amendment's goal of 
free flow of information.64 Therefore, given the lack of evidence in 
Anderson that speech by the city of Boston would be so overpowering 
as to drown out speech in the private sector, the Anderson Court's 
conclusion that the public should only hear debate from private cor-
porations and individuals is difficult to justify.~5 
Notwithstanding the weakness of the Supreme Judicial Court's analysis 
of the state's balanced debate argument, its analysis of the state's con-
59 435 U.S. at 789. 
00 ld. In contrast, the Anderson Court noted that the statutory restriction "avoids 
the possibility of a babel of municipal huckstering .... " 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 
2317, 380 N .E.2d at 639 (emphasis added). The Supreme Judicial Court acknowl-
edged that "[t]he facts in the record do not demonstrate that the city will abuse 
its alleged right of advocacy such as by issuing deceptive, vindictive, or coercive 
publications, nor does the record show that the city's publications would be mo-
nopolistic, or even domineering .... " ld. at 2318 n.18, 380 N.E.2d at 639 n.18. 
61 435 U.S. at 791 n.31 (citation omitted). 
62 ld. at 789. 
~3 ld. at 791. 
64 ld. at 792. The Court noted the state's contention "that the State's interest in 
sustaining the active role of the individual citizen is especially great with respect 
to referenda because they involve the direct participation of the people in the 
lawmaking process." The Court concluded, however, that "far from inviting greater 
restriction of speech, the direct participation of the people in a referendum, if 
anything, increases the need for 'the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources.''' ld. at 790 n.29 (citation omitted). 
65 A fair reading of Anderson suggests that the Supreme Judicial Court would 
not have considered the constitutional question had it not felt required to do so 
by the Bellotti decision. "[W]e suspect that the First Amendment has nothing to 
do with this intra-state question of the rights of a political subdivision to disregard 
the mandate of the supreme legislative authirity of the State . . . ." 1978 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 2313, 380 N.E.2d at 637. "By its terms and in its traditional applica-
tions, the First Amendment has nothing to do with a State's determination to refrain 
from speech on a given topic or topiCS and to bar its various subdivisions from 
expending funds in contravention of that determination." ld. 
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cern for views of dissenting citizens does lend support for the distinction 
between private and municipal corporations.66 The Anderson Court 
viewed the 1977 United States Supreme Court decision of Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education 67 as support for its decision in this regard.68 
In Abood, the Supreme Court held that a state may not compel non-
union public employees to pay a service fee to the union where the fee 
was used to fund various ideological union expenditures with which the 
employees disagreed.69 According to the Anderson Court, the expendi-
ture of public funds by the city to influence the vote on a referendum 
issue presented an analogous problem: a dissenting minority of taxpayers 
was compelled to finance the expression of views with which they dis-
agreed.'o Because a refund, which had been required in Abood, would 
prove unwieldy in a taxpayer setting, the Anderson Court instead struck 
down the entire appropriation so that those who wished to make con-
tributions would have to do so privately, rather than through the mu-
nicipal entity.'] 
Since governmental speech generally need not he neutral,72 it is in-
evitable that, given the varied roles of modem government, expenditures 
will be made and views advanced with which some taxpayers will 
disagree. Bellotti found the balance to be weighted in favor of the 
"open marketplace" of expression with regard to private corporations. 
Anderson, on the other hand, has identified and accepted in the case 
of municipal corporations a "controlled marketplace" from which the 
state may exclude the views of a municipal entity.73 
66 Id. at 2319, 380 N.E.2d 639. 
67 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
68 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2319, 380 N.E.2d at 640. 
69 431 U.S. at 235-36. 
70 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2319-20, 380 N.E.2d at 639-40. 
71 Id. at 2320 n.20, 380 N.E.2d at 640 n.20. 
72 As the Court noted in Anderson, "[T]here are a variety of instances in which 
government funds are used lawfully to express views and conclusions on matters 
of importance where various taxpayers may disagree with those views and conclu-
sions. The Constitution of the United States, thus, does not forbid all government 
communications and publications which are not neutral and purely informative." 
Id. at 2312-13, 380 N.E.2d at 637. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 12-4 (1978). 
73 Campare Professor Emerson's views on municipal expression, as described in 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2317 n.16, 380 N.E.2d at 639 n.16. Emerson argued that 
"government's right of expression should not extend to any sphere that is outside 
the governmental functions .... " For example, Emerson argued that a govern-
ment could not spend funds in support of a candidate for office even though such 
speech would most certainly qualify as protected under the first amendment, since 
"it is not the function of the government to get itself reelected." Id. The Supreme 
Judicial Court commented that were it to apply Emerson's standard to the referen-
dum issue, such partisan government expreSSion on the referendum issue would 
likewise fall outside the ambits of a proper governmental function. Id. 
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§7.7. Procedural Due Process-Motor Vehicle Regulations. In 
Mackey v. Montrym,1 the United States Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a Massachusetts statute 2 requiring automatic suspension 
of a driver's license upon a driver's refusal to take a breathalyzer test 
after being arrested for driving under the influence of liquor. Defend-
ant Montrym was arrested for drunken driving and initially refused to 
take the breathalyzer test. 3 Shortly thereafter, after speaking with an 
attomey, Montrym changed his mind and requested the police to con-
duct the tesU The police refused his request.5 As required by the 
statute, the officer filed a report of Montrym's refusal with the Registrar 
of Motor Vehicles, who subsequently revoked Montrym's license for 
ninety days.6 After a state court dismissed the complaint brought 
against Montrym for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor,7 
Montrym's attomey notified the Registrar of the dismissal and requested 
without success the retum of Montrym's driving license.s 
§7.7. 1 443 U.S. 1 (1979). 
2 C.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(f), provides that: 
Whoever operates a motor vehicle upon any [public] way ... shall be 
deeme.d to have consented to submit to a chemical test or analysis of his breath 
in the event that he is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor . . .. If the person arrested refuses to submit 
to such a test or analysis, after having been informed that his license . . . to 
operate motor vehicles . . . shall be suspended for a period of ninety days for 
such refusal, . . . the police officer before whom such refusal was made shall 
immediately prepare a written report of such refusal. Such written report of 
refusal shall be endorsed by a third person who shall have witnessed such 
refusal. . .. Each such report shall set forth the grounds of the officer's be-
lief that the person arrested had been driving a motor vehicle . . . while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, and shall state that such person had refused 
to submit to such chemical test or analysis when requested by such police 
officer to do so. Each such report shall be endorsed by the police. chief . . . 
and shall be sent forthwith to the registrar. Upon receipt of such report, the 
registrar shall suspend any license or permit to operate, motor vehicles issued 
to such person . . . for a period of ninety days. 
3 443 U.S. at 4. 
4 ld. at 5. 
5 The statute provides that once the breathalyzer test has been refused, the 
officer shall make a report to the Registrar. See note 2 supra. 
6 443 U.S. at 6. The Court noted that the statute gives the Registrar no 
discretion to stay suspension of a license. ld. at 6. Hence, even though a state 
court had ddsmissed the complaint brought against Montrym on June 2, 1976, upon 
receipt of the officer's report, the Registrar formally suspended Montrym's license 
on June 7, 1976. See note 5 infra. The suspension notice informed Montrym of 
his right to appeal the suspension pursuant to c. 90, § 28. An appeal, however, 
does not stay the Registrar's ruling. 433 U.S. at 6 n.4. 
7 The Court and the dissent presumed that the "cryptic" dismissal order was 
based on the refusal of the police to administer a breathalyzer test to Montrym 
following his attempt to retract his initial refusal. ld. at 4, 23. 
sId. at 6. Following the dismissal of the complaint, Montrym's attorney ini-
tially requested the Registrar to stay the suspension of Montrym's license. Upon 
the subsequent suspension of Montrym's license, his aUorney requested the Registrar 
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Montrym brought suit in federal district court,9 alleging that the 
statute was unconstitutional for its failure to provide a hearing prior to 
the revocation of his license.lO In the first of two opinions, a three-judge 
district court held the statute violative of the due process clause, 
permanently enjoined the Registrar from further enforcement of the 
statute, and directed him to return the license to Montrym.n On direot 
appeal,12 the Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and 
remanded with directions to reconsider in view of Dixon v. Love,l3 In 
Love the Court upheld an Illinois statute permitting summary revocation 
of a license upon conviction of three moving traffic violations within a 
one-year period.14 On remand, the district court affirmed tts earlier 
opinion, viewing Love as distinguishable from the case before it. IS 
to return the license. Neither letter enclosed a certified copy of the state court's 
order of dismissal. According to the Court, "[hlad Montrym enclosed a copy of 
the order dismissing the, drunk-driving charge,the entire matter might well have 
been disposed of at that stage without more." Id. at 8. 
II Id. Montrym chose to forgo the ad~nistrative hearing provided by c. 90, 
§ 24 (1 ) (9). Id. Section 24 provides that a person whose license has been sus-
pended "shall be entitled to a hearing before the registrar . . .." G.L. c. 90, 
§ 24( 1 ) (9). The parties stipulated that this hearing would be available as soon 
as the driver surrenders his license, 433 U.S. at 7-8 n.5. The hearing is limited 
to a determination of whether there was probable cause for the arrest, whether the 
person was arrested, and whether the person refused to take the breathalyzer test. 
"If after such hearing, the registrar finds on anyone of the said issues in the 
negative, the registrar shall reinstate such license .... " G.L. c. 90, § 24 (1)( 9). 
Given the limited issues that may be raised at suoh a hearing, Montrym may have 
beLieved the, hearing procedure to be futile. 
10 Montrym sought damages and both declaratory and injunctive relief. A tern-
J?Orary restraining order enjoining the license suspension was issued by a single 
federal judge" who also ordered the return of Montrym's license. A three-judge 
district court thereafter heard the merits. Id. at 8-9. 
11 Montrym v. Panora, 429 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Mass. 1977). 
12 Panora v. Mintrym, 434 U.S. 916 (1977). 
13 431 U.S. 105 (1977). 
14 Id. at lOB. The Illinois statute authorized the Secretary of State to revoke a 
driver's license without a hearing. Under the Illinois statute, the Secretary of State 
was authorized to suspend or revoke a driver's license without a preliminary hearing 
upon a showing by official records or other evidence that the driver's conduct fell 
into one, of eighteen categories, one of which was that the driver had been repeat-
edly convicted of traffic violations. Pursuant to this proviSion, the Secretary issued 
a regulation mandating revocation in case where a driver's license had been sus-
pended three times within a ten-year period. The statute further provided for 
~mediate written notice of suspension or revocation to the driver and provided 
for the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing, to be held within twenty days after 
receipt of a written request. In a case of hardship, a restrioted driving permit 
could be issued. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 95~, § 6-206(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1979). 
15 Montrym v. Panora, 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977). The Illinois driver 
in Dixon v. Love had already had the opportunity for a full judicial hearing in 
connection with each of the traffic convictions on which the revocation was based. 
Thus, the only question for the Court was the timing of the hearing. After con-
sidering the minimal risk of an erroneous revocation (based on the prior court 
convictions), the s,trong state interest in highway safety, and the nature of the 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed. Employing a three-pronged 
balancing test 16 to determine whether due process required a hearing 
prior to suspension of the license,17 the Court in a five-to-four decision 
ooncluded that Love controlled.18 It upheld the Massachusetts statute, 
thereby permitting a summary suspension of the driver's license pending 
the outcome of a prompt post-suspension hearing.19 
In analyzing the various interests involved,20 the Court first addressed 
the effect of the deprivation on the individual. While acknowledging 
that a ninety-day loss of a license was not unsubstantial,21 the Court 
nevertheless found that a ninety-day suspension was less burdensome 
than the one sanctioned in Love.22 The Court noted that the Massa-
chusetts statute minimized the delay inherent in the Illinois procedure 
upheld in Love.23 A Massachusetts driver could obtain an immediate 
post-suspension hearing "simply by walking into one of the Registrar's 
local offices and requesting a hearing." 24 
Turning to the second factor relevant to determining whether the 
Massachusetts statute satisfied due process, the Court discussed the risk 
individual interest affected by the revocation, the Court held that a post-deprivation 
hearing was sufficient. 431 U.S. at 113-14. 
16 The test, as enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319' (1976), re-
quired consideration of the following factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail. 
ld. at 335. The Montrym Court stated that: 
Both cases [Dixon and Montryml involve the constitutionality of a statutory 
scheme for administrative suspension of a driver's license for statutorily defined 
cause without a pre-suspension hearing. In each, the sole question presented 
is the appropriate timing of the legal process due a licensee. And in both 
cases, that question must be determined by reference to the factors set forth 
in Eldridge. 
443 U.S. at 11. 
17 Whether a driver's license is referred to as a "right" or a "privilege," it is a 
property interest that merits due process protection. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 
539 (1971). M ontrym addressed the issue of what process was due in connection 
with seizure of this property interest. 
18 433 U.S. at 11. 
19 ld. at 19. The Court failed to address the question of whether, independent 
of the notice of suspension required by c. 90, § 24 (l ) ( g), the constitution mandated 
notice of the right to an immediate hearing before the Registrar. ld. at 10 n.6. 
20 See note 16 supra. 
21 433 U.S. at 12. The Court acknowledged that the state "will not be able 
to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and economic hardship 
suffered by reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous suspension through post-
suspension review procedures." ld. at 11 (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. at 113). 
22 ld. at 11. 
23 See note 16 supra. 
24 443 U.S. at 13. 
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of error inherent in the Massachusetts scheme.25 Noting that the "Due 
Process Clause . . . does not mandate that all governmental decision-
making comply with standards that assure perfect error-free determina-
tions," 26 the Court concluded that the risk of error inherent in the 
Massachusetts scheme was not sufficiently great to require a hearing 
prior to suspension.27 In arriving at this conclusion the Court placed 
particular emphasis on the ability of a police officer to identify a driver 
operating under the influence and on the requirement that the refusal 
to take the breathalyzer be witnessed by two police officers.28 The 
Court stressed the Registrar's obligation to review the police report for 
errors prior to suspension, and to ensure that all statutory requirements 
have been met.29 
Addressing the governmental interests at stake,30 the Court concluded 
that, as in Love, the state's interest in preserving the safety of its high-
ways fully supported adoption of summary procedures.31 It found that 
summary procedures not only deterred drunken driving, but also con-
tributed to highway safety by removing drunk drivers from the high-
ways. The Court noted further that the procedures helped the state 
obtain needed evidence hy encouraging drivers to take the breathalyzer 
25 See note 16 supra. 
20 433 U.S. at 13. (citation omitted). The Court commented that 
when prompt post-deprivation review is available for correction of adminis-
trative error, we, have generally required no more than that the pre-deprivation 
procedures used be designed to provide a reasonable reliable basis for conolud-
ing that the facts justifying the official action are as a responSible governmental 
official warrants them to be. 
ld. (citations omitted). 
27 ld. at 14. 
28 ld. The Court noted that the trained and experienced police officer making 
the arrest and reporting the refusal to submit to a breathalyzer would have little 
occasion to misrepresent the "historical facts." ld. 
29 ld. at 16. 
30 Recognition of the governmental interests involved is the third prong of the 
Eldridge test. See note 16 supra. 
31 ld. at 19. The interest in public safety, according to the Court, distinguished 
this case from Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), on which the district court 
relied. ld. In Bell, the Court struck down a Georgia statute which required sus-
pension of an uninsured motorist's motor vehicle registration and driver's license 
if the driver was involved in an accident and failed to pos,tsecurity to cover the 
amount of the damages claimed. Although an administrative hearing was held 
prior to the sus'pension, the statute excluded considexation if the motorist's fault 
in the accident. The Supreme Court held that due process prohibited the state 
from eliminating coru;ideration of liability in the prior hearing where "the statutory 
scheme makes liability an important factor .in the State's determination to suspend 
a license." 402 U.S. at 541. In analyzing Bell, the Court in Love emphasized the 
important public interest in preserving safety of the roads and highways. In con-
trast, in Bell the "'only purpose' of the Georgia statute . . . was 'to obtain security 
from whioh to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident:" 
431 U.S. at 114 (quoting Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. at 540). 
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test. ~2 According to the Court, these interests were not undercut by 
the state's decision not to suspend the licenses of those drivers who 
chose to take, and who failed, the breathalyzer test.33 The Court also 
noted the state's strong interest in avoiding the fiscal and administrative 
burdens associated with providing a pre-suspension hearing.34 The 
Court concluded that these interests outweighed those advanced by 
Montrym and justified summary suspension of Montrym's license pend-
ing a post-suspension hearing.35 
The dissenting opinion, which paid much greater attention to past 
precedents and to the facts, argued that the failure of the state to afford 
Montrym an opportunity to be heard prior to suspension of his license 
"offends the concept of basic fairness that underlies the constitutional 
due process guarantee." 36 The dissenters maintained that case law 
established "a presumptive requirement of notice and a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard before the State acts finally to deprive a person 
of his property." ~7 The dissent insisted that the need for a pre-depriva-
tion hearing was increased where, as under the Massachusetts statute, 
a wrongful suspension could only be shortened but not undone.38 Fur-
thermore, the dissenters maintained that the Court's decision in Love 
did not create an exception to the presumption in favor of prior hear-
ings. 3u The dissent also contended that the state's interest in protecting 
32 433 U.S. at 18. The Court said the availability of a "presuspension hearing 
would substantially undennine the state interest in public safety by giving drivers 
significant incentive to refuse the breathalyzer test . . ." and would lead to more 
hearings from which would in turn "impose a substantial fiscal and administrative 
burden on the Commonwealth." ld. 
~3 ld. at 19. "A state plainly has the right to offer incentives for taking a test 
that prOVides the most reliable form of evidence, of intoxication for use in sub-
sequent proceedings .. " "[Tlhe Commonwealth is not required by the Due 
Process Clause to adopt an 'all or nothing' approach ... " to the drunk driving 
problem. ld. 
34 ld. at 18. 
35 ld. at 19. 
36 ld. at 21. 
37 ld. at 20. The dissent oited Memphis Light, Gas, & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 
U.S. 1, 16, 19 (1978); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 
402 U.S. 535, 542; Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). 
38 443 U.S. at 21. "[WJhen adjudicative facts are involved, when no valid 
governmental interest would demonstrably be disserved by delay, and when full 
retroactive relief cannot be provided, an after-the-fact evidentiary hearing on a 
critical issue is not constitutionally sufficient." ld. 21-22. 
39 ld. at 22. The dissent distinguished Love, where the suspension was based 
on records of traffic convictions, from the factual issues involved in the encounter 
between the police and the driver in Montrym. The driver in Love had already 
been convicted of three traffic violations. Thus, he in fact had had a pre-suspension 
hearing in which the relevant facts could be contested. Montryrn, on the other 
hand, had no pre-suspension hearing in which to contest the assertions of the police. 
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the public from unsafe drivers would not be hampered hy the delay 
necessitated by a prior hearing.4o The purported interest in summary 
removal of drunken drivers from the road was belied by the state's 
refusal to exclude from the road those drivers who took the breathalyzer 
test and failed. 41 The summary suspension procedure, rather, was "ob-
viously premised not on intoxication, but on noncooperation with the 
police." 42 
Finally, the dissent questioned the sufficiency of the post-suspension 
hearing afforded by the statute.43 It pOinted out that the suspension 
notice sent to a driver failed to mention the opportunity of a hearing 
before the Registrar.44 It noted further that the post-suspension hearing 
before the Registrar was an illusory protection, because the Registrar 
lacked authority to review any legal issue in the dispute.45 Hence, the 
dissent concluded that the post-deprivation hearing provided in the 
commonwealth's summary suspension statute was constitutionally in-
sufficient. 46 
The constitutionality of another motor vehicle statute, which raised 
due process issues similar to those in M ontrym, was presented to the 
Massachusetts Appeals Court in Bane v. City of Boston.47 In Bane, 
plaintiff challenged the validity of Boston's "tow and hold" law, which 
authorized the police to tow vehicles with five or more outstanding 
parking tickets and to hold those vehicles until the tickets were paid 
or bond was posted.48 Bane claimed that the seizure of his car pursuant 
ld. Accordingly, the dissent sugge.sted that the case was more closely analogous 
to Bell v. Burson, which required a pre-suspension hearing on all statutory condi-
tions precedent to suspension. ld. at 23. See note 31 supra. 
40 ld. at 27. The dissent rejected as a justification the administrative costs that 
would result from a pre-suspension hearing requirement. It pointed out that the 
Court has routinely noted that the fourteenth amendment "recognizes higher values 
than 'speed and efficiency.''' ld. (citation omitted). 
41 ld. at 26. 
42 ld. 
43 See note 9 supra. 
44 443 U.S. at 27 n.4. See note 9 supra. The dissent speculated that Montrym 
may not have sought a hearing before the Registrar simply because he was unaware 
that he had such a right. The dissent noted that "notice of a procedural right is 
itself integral to due process." ld. at 27-28 (citing Memphis Light, Cas & Water 
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1978)). 
45 443 U.S. at 27-29. 
46 ld. at 21-22. 
47 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2116, 396 N.E.2d 155. The suit sought de-
claratory relief pursuant to C.L. c. 231A. 
48 Acts of 1929, c. 263, § 2, as amended through Acts of 1973, c. 253, BOSTON, 
MASS., CODE C. 9, § 210 (1975) provides: 
[AJ motor vehicle may in any calendar year, if in such year and in the 
oalendar year immediately preceding five or more notices in the aggregate have 
been affixed to said vehicle as provided in said section twenty C [C.L. c. 90] 
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to the statute violated the due process clause insofar as it failed to 
afford him notice and hearing prior to seizure.49 Relying on the inter-
pretation of the statute given by a federal district court in Bricker v. 
Craven,50 the Appeals Court rejected plaintiff's contention. In Bricker, 
the court had concluded that the statute was supported by a sufficient 
governmental interest, "that the procedure was reasonable with a factual 
basis supporting the action, and that a judicial hearing prior to a final 
deprivation of property was available." 51 The court rejeoted plaintiff's 
contention that Bricker had overstated the governmental interest in 
alleviating traffic problems and in ensuring payment of parking fines.52 
Thus, during the Survey year, courts rejected two due process chal-
lenges to Massachusetts statutes permitting the summary seizure of a 
motorist's property. In Mackey v. Montrym, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the Massachusetts statute mandating summary suspension 
of a driver's license when the driver has refused to take a breathalyzer 
test following his arrest for drunken driving. In Bane v. City of Boston 
the Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld Boston's "tow and hold" law, 
which permits the police to tow vehicles with five or more outstanding 
parking tickets. Both of these decisions assure that law enforcement 
agencies will be permitted to effect certain summary seizures of a 
motorist's property as a method of enforCing motor vehicle regulations. 
and have not been disposed of, be removed to, and stored in, a convenient 
place in the city until all charges lawfully imposed for such removal and storage 
have been paid and due notice has been received that either the fines provided 
in such notices have been paid or security for the payment thereof has been 
deposited. 
49 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2120-21, 396 N.E.2d at 157. 
50 391 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1975). 
51 ld. at 1979 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 2119-20, 396 N.E.2d at 157 (emphasis 
added). 
52 ld. at 2120, 396 N.E.2d at 157. 
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